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This research is a case study analysis of NetOne Cellular (Pvt) Ltd, a state enterprise in the 
mobile cellular telecommunications industry in Zimbabwe which has failed to perform to 
government and public expectation since its launch in 1996. At the advent of mobile 
telecommunications industry in Zimbabwe in the 1990s, it was expected that the Government 
of Zimbabwe would reap huge revenues in the lucrative telecommunications industry by 
being the pioneer and monopolising the provision of mobile telecommunications in the 
country. Government therefore, set up NetOne, initially as a department under the Postal and 
Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) and later turned it into an incorporated company in 
2001. The company has however failed to perform to expectations despite the advantages 
which usually go with government protection and favouritism in comparison to its 
competitors Econet Wireless Zimbabwe and Telecel Zimbabwe. This study provides 
evidence of the company’s poor performance, an analysis and discussion of the underlying 
and proximate causal factors thereto as well as a set of recommendations and possible ways 
forward.  
The study seeks to explore and prove that the Zimbabwean political settlements, 
mismanagement of economic rents, as well as the scourge of poor corporate governance, 
undercapitalisation, and unfavourable sectoral and regulatory dynamics negatively impact on 
NetOne’s performance. Derived from the foregoing the above are the cascading effects of 
inadequate leadership and business practices within the organisation which also played a 
major role in the company’s modicum growth and underperformance over the years. It 
concludes that the Zimbabwe political settlements and failure to manage and effectively 
exploit political rents is the major contributor to the company’s failure and lead to both 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 provides the background of the problem, problem statement, research objectives 
and the research questions. The essence of the whole chapter is to set the tone for solving the 
problem of perennial underperformance by NetOne as evidenced by low market share, poor 
service offering and loss making by the state owned company. 
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
As a way of growing the economy, raising revenue and providing critical services, the 
Government of Zimbabwe runs numerous state enterprises and parastatals. This phenomenon 
is not peculiar to Zimbabwe since most governments across the world do the same in 
strategic areas. Like many other state enterprises NetOne is expected to play a fundamental 
role in the resuscitation of the ailing Zimbabwean economy. The company was formed in 
1996 initially as a monopoly in the provision of mobile telecommunications services. Now 
almost 20 years down the line, the state enterprise is making losses while its competing 
private owned companies like Econet Wireless are performing well beyond expectations. 
Government accuses NetOne of underperformance as pointed out by the current Minister of 
ICT, Postal and Courier Services, Supa Mandiwanzira, when he said; 
“What is NetOne’s performance in comparison to other operators? Government as a 
shareholder is very much aware of the other telecoms operators in the sector and that it is 
nothing but successful and profitable. There is no reason why state enterprises should not be 
profitable’’ (Techzim, May 2015).  
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
As indicated above, in the Zimbabwe mobile cellular industry, phenomenal growth has been 
realised by one private mobile cellular company, Econet Wireless  Zimbabwe, while the 
government owned, NetOne Cellular (Pvt) Limited has perpetually lagged behind. This has 
led to the emergence of a de-facto oligopoly in the industry in the form of Econet Wireless 
Zimbabwe. NetOne is failing to expand services, pay dividends to treasury and meet its debt 
redemptions as well as annual statutory obligations due to the telecommunications regulator, 
the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ). NetOne 
also does not sufficiently contribute to the Universal Services Fund (USF) which all 
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operators must contribute to for infrastructural development in remote and underserviced 
areas.  
The company also made significant losses during the dollarization era from 2010 to 2014 as 
revealed by its Audited Financial Statements summarized in Chapter 5 below. Meanwhile 
NetOne’s major competitors, especially Econet Wireless has been making huge profits during 
the same period buttressing assertions from some quarters that government run solutions do 
not work. Observers also note with concern that NetOne has issues of poor corporate 
governance.  
The following questions will be dealt with in this research;  
 Can the Zimbabwe government run a commercial state enterprise viably?  
 What are the underlying and proximate causes of NetOne’s poor performance over the 
years?  
 Since government is the 100% owner of the company which it allegedly provides with 
protection and succour, why is NetOne allowed to continue supplying mediocre and 
inefficient services?  
 What can be done to turnaround the fortunes of NetOne?  
 
1.3.PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The research seeks to explore and explain how political settlements and management of 
economic rents, as well as other underlying and proximate factors have contributed to the 
poor performance of NetOne Cellular (Pvt) Limited and recommend policy measures and 
operational issues that can be formulated and executed to turn around the company’s 
fortunes. NetOne has been chosen because of the potential of mobile telecommunications 
services to facilitate accelerated social and economic development. Achievements made can 
provide lessons to be learnt and possibly be adapted for the transformation of other state-
owned enterprises in the Zimbabwean economy consequently leading to massive social and 
economic transformation for the country. 
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
i. To find out how political settlements and the management/ mismanagement of 
political rent affect the performance of NetOne 
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ii. To establish the extent to which poor corporate governance and weak business 
acumen affect the performance of NetOne 
iii. To establish the extent to which sectoral and regulatory dynamics affect  NetOne’s 
ability to raise capital for investment 
iv. To recommend ways forward for the effective turnaround of NetOne 




















CHAPTER 2: HYPOTHESES, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, SCOPE OF 
RESEARCH, JUSTIFICATION, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Having outlined the above, Chapter 2 will pave way for the application for the research 
methodology and attendant details. It states the hypotheses, research methodology and scope 
of the research, research justification, ethical considerations and limitations of the study. The 
hypotheses seek to make precise statements to be tested by the research findings. The 
methodology will give the set of approaches and instruments used to gather and analyse the 
evidence.  
2.2. HYPOTHESES 
Hypotheses attempt to answer the research questions. They can be considered to be intelligent 
hunches, guesses or predictions that help a researcher find answers or solutions to research 
questions (Haber, undated). The relationships of the hypotheses relating to the NetOne case 
study are portrayed in Diagram 1 below. 
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The situation that NetOne finds itself in is deeply rooted in the politics of the ZANU PF 
political system and its government. The ZANU PF government inherited and nurtured the 
colonial regime’s system of institutionalised politicised economic rents extraction. With the 
ruling ZANU PF party highly cash-strapped following the failure of its companies from 
which it used to extract rents, it has turned to state enterprises such as NetOne as sources of 
income to finance its operations. The Zimbabwe political settlements the development of the 
mobile telecommunications industry and in turn impacts the governance of NetOne leading 
weak internal controls, unethical behaviour, to low employee engagement, poor bankability, 
failure to attract low cost finance, low investment in infrastructure and products, poor 
approaches to business, failure to stand completion thus ultimately underperformance.  
 
HYPOTHEISIS 1: Due to Zimbabwe’s political settlements and mismanagement of political 
rents NetOne will be unable to sustain a competitive position in Zimbabwe’s 
telecommunications industry. 
Politics and power balancing shape the development trajectory of any country. Historically, 
the Zimbabwe political economy has been characterised by political patronage and 
centralised rent management. Formed in 1996 as a department under the Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) during the structural adjustment decade, NetOne has 
not been spared from ZANU PF’s politicisation and rent-seeking. Its growth was severely 
incapacitated during the crisis period from 2000 to 2008 where the Zimbabwean economy 
sank to the lowest ebbs and rent seeking in the economy became free for all with the ruling 
party being more predatory to survive. The paper seeks to prove or disprove the contribution 
by political settlements and rent management in terms of the governance of the company 
(Hypothesis 2), and the bankability of the company (Hypothesis 4) leading to its 
underperformance. 
HYPOTHESIS 2:  NetOne’s performance will remain poor if its corporate governance 
practices are not improved. 
NetOne is one of the companies which constitute a significant share of the economy 
accounted for by SOEs in Zimbabwe. As Dawson and Kelsall (2011) observe, the character 
of SOEs in Zimbabwe increasingly changed  ‘from production and marketing mechanisms 
into sites of patronage as ZANU PF appointed boards based less on technical competence 
than on clientelism’ (p9).  In the foreword of the Corporate Governance Framework for State 
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Enterprises and Parastatals (CGFSEP) which was launched in November 2010, the President 
of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe acknowledged that weak corporate governance 
and unethical practices were chief causes of poor performance by SOEs. He was supported 
by the then Deputy Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Arthur Mutambara, who asserted that SOEs 
have potential to contribute 40% to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but due to the poor 
governance system in SOEs that was characterized by role ambiguity, ineffective boards, 
ineffective management systems, failure to adhere to statutes, these otherwise profitable 
entities are consistently performing dismally (Corporate Governance Framework for State 
Enterprises and Parastatals; CGFSEP, 2010). Poor corporate governance in turn leads to poor 
management as evidenced by poor ethics, uncompetitive approaches to business and low 
employee engagement leading to underperformance. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: NetOne will continue failing to compete effectively if sectoral (including 
state procurement systems) and regulatory dynamics are not reformed. 
This hypothesis has been included for logical completeness but will not be explored since it 
can form a complete research area and cannot be adequately covered in this research.  
Following the unbundling of the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation in 2000, 
Zimbabwe’s telecommunications operators are regulated by the Postal and 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (POTRAZ) which was formed in the same year 
and assumed responsibility in 2001. The policy environment is in transition towards a 
converged licensing regime which is very slow. The main future aim is to regulate services – 
and not technology. To this effect, the regulatory authority (POTRAZ) is currently working 
on a new set of draft regulations. The current licensing framework is not conducive to 
promote operators to introduce new services.  
A converged licensing framework will liberate operators to innovate and introduce new 
services without worrying about whether the service requires licensing by the broadcasting 
regulator or the telecommunications regulator, thereby promoting investment and making 
available a wider variety of services. This argument can go either way since it can work in 
favour of NetOne or other operators like Econet in an industry where the first mover is likely 
to be the winner. 
The company’s procurement is also governed by the State Procurement Board (SPB). Whilst, 
Government, as shareholder, insists on performance targets being met, red tape frustrates the 
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faster acquisition of equipment and other services through stringent and cumbersome 
procurement regulations and procedures. The company is put at a disadvantage compared to 
its private sector competitors who quickly make decisions and implement them as quickly as 
possible. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: NetOne will continue failing to raise enough investment capital if political 
settlements, unfavourable investment climate and corporate governance issues are not 
resolved.  
Although commercialised, NetOne has been operating without significant y investment funds 
for years in a hotly contested environment where its competitors have been enjoying large 
investments for growth. NetOne is not directly funded by the state. It’s funding has been 
through its own operations, sparsely spread local and foreign borrowing with the guarantee 
given by the government. The continued economic sanctions/restrictions imposed on the 
country for the past decade and half and the poor Zimbabwe corporate governance and 
business environment have seen the company failing to attract ready and cheap capital as 
compared to its competitors seriously affecting its operations.   
HYPOTHEISIS 5: A home grown reform based on good fit approaches compatible with the 
broad Zimbabwean political settlement will improve the performance of NetOne. 
There have not been significant efforts to transform NetOne into a viable company by both 
government as the shareholder and its successive boards and management. Half backed 
approaches like partial commercialisation and performance management approaches like the 
Results Based Management (RBM) system and the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) have been 
imposed on the company without really testing their applicability considering the unique 
political and economic setting of the company; hence they have yielded positive results so 
far. 
2.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
In this research, a case study analysis of NetOne Cellular (Pvt) Limited’s underperformance 
and causal factors was carried out. A case study is a strategy for doing research involving 
empirical investigation of a phenomenon within its real life context, in this case the state 
enterprise. The research methodology paradigm used is qualitative. Interviews, documentary 
analysis and personal observations were used as research instruments. Interviews included 
face-to-face discussions on NetOne’s performance in comparison with Econet Wireless 
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Zimbabwe and Telecel Zimbabwe. Issues discussed included market share, network coverage 
and infrastructure development and deployment levels, employment levels, revenues, ARPE, 
ARPU, CAPEX, EBIDTAs, as well as good corporate governance practices like board 
appointments and autonomy. The research focussed on exploring hypotheses 1, 2 and 4. 
The case study method enabled the researcher to test the hypotheses and also provide a 
source of new research questions. The researcher targeted individuals with knowledge on 
SOE issues. Matters of political influence and corporate governance being higher level in 
nature are mostly known by top leadership and management in organisations, and thus a 
small sample of interviewees was used as it allowed the researcher to personally choose 
people with certain characteristics to include as participants as well a unit of analysis that was 
typical of the population with regard to the characteristics under study. 
 At NetOne, the interviewees were divided into two categories; namely management and 
middle level officers in the organisation. At POTRAZ top management and a selected 
number of officers with technical know-how in the field were also engaged during the 
research process. With regard to other key stakeholders senior people at director level and 
above were interviewed. 
The total number of interviewees was therefore 32: 15 from NetOne, 2 former NetOne board 
members, 5 from the sector regulator, 3 from the Ministry of Information Technology, postal 
and Courier Services, 2 from the Ministry of Finance, 1 from Econet Wireless Zimbabwe, 1 
from Telecel Zimbabwe, 1 from State Procurement Board (SPB), 1 from Office of the 
Auditor General (OAG) and 1 from State Enterprise Restructuring Agency (SERA).   
At NetOne, the Managing Director, Company Secretary, Finance Manager, Technical 
Director, Internal Auditor as well as technical and marketing and sales officers who cannot be 
named for fear of reprisal were interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was to gather 
basic facts about NetOne’s underperformance and causal factors thereto.  At POTRAZ 
interviews were carried out with the Acting Director General and Finance and Administration 
Director as well as two officers from the Economics and Tariffs Department.  
Data on the history and topical issues regarding NetOne’s  comparative performance and 
other statistics like customer bases, employee statistics, board sizes, tenure of CEOs and 
boards was mined from company websites, brochures, newspapers, POTRAZ sector 
performance reports and other publications was used. The data relating to some corporate 
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governance variables such as number of women on the board, number of independent 
directors and external audits was also obtained from the company database.  
Primary data was critical for this research as it addressed key components of the research 
focus. Profitability measures like ARPU, ARPE, CAPEX and EBIDTAs were limited to a six 
year period (2009-2014) for the convenience of excluding the hyperinflationary period 
between 2000 and 2008. 
Secondary data was acquired through the analysis of documents pertaining to NetOne and its 
competitors and the relevant government departments as well as press and media reports.  
 2.4. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The researcher conducted himself ethically in carrying out the research. Confidentiality of 
information given by research subjects and the anonymity of all respondents was respected in 
all areas, and where it did not apply, the consent of the affected respondents was sought. All 
prospective participants were given as much information as possible with regards to the 
research so that they made informed decisions on their possible involvement and 
participation. NetOne requested the researcher to share the findings of the study. 
 2.5. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
While poor performance pervades almost all SOEs in Zimbabwe, this research was restricted 
to the mobile telecommunications industry and in particular, NetOne (Pvt) Limited due to the 
lucrativeness of the industry and the potential that mobile telecommunications provide as a 
catalyst for both social and economic development. The research also concentrated on key 
performance indicators of the company in analysing its underperformance.  
 2.6. JUSTIFICATION OF RESEARCH 
This research seeks to make a contribution to the ongoing public and policy debate and 
dialogue on proper and transparent management of SOEs. In developed and emerging 
countries, SOEs contribute to a substantial part of the economy’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and employment (OECD, 2006).  Elsewhere, the Singaporean model of State Owned 
Enterprises has shown the world that SOEs can drive the national economy and they thrive in 
an environment where there is good corporate governance, professionalism and most 
importantly, despite the political system, where there is transparency and accountability.  
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The Government of Zimbabwe is facing serious revenue challenges and one potential source 
of revenue is NetOne since it is operating in the lucrative telecommunications industry.  The 
Government should therefore be keen to turnaround this company into a viable entity that can 
provide not only the much needed revenue to the fiscus but also sustainable employment 
creation too. Zimbabweans are wondering why private companies in the same industry have 
done so well and not the SOE.  
 
Furthermore, mobile telecommunications have become a key enabler to social and economic 
development. NetOne (Pvt) Limited is one of the Government’s strategic national institutions 
that must drive the telecommunications sector. Thus Government will reap the biggest 
benefits from this study along with the poor citizenry who are the real owners of the 
company. At sector level, other stakeholders like consumers of NetOne (Pvt) Limited’s 
services; POTRAZ the regulator of the sector the Ministry of ICT, Postal and Courier 
Services; Parliament of Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Finance; the State Enterprise 
Restructuring Agency (SERA) and creditors who are owed long overdue amounts will also 
benefit from the research and its recommendations.  
Last but not least the researcher will also benefit not only from the application of the research 
skills he acquired in this course but also from the new knowledge that seeks to answer the 
question whether African governments can successfully run commercial enterprises.  
 2.7. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
Time and resources limited the research to just one state owned company in the Zimbabwe 
telecommunications industry. More SOEs would have enriched the responses, conclusions 
and recommendations. The research was done during the time most SOEs’ operations were 
on the spotlight hence getting information was not easy. However the assistance received 
from the Managing Director of NetOne and the Acting Director General of POTRAZ 
mitigated the challenges. 
Having outlined the research hypotheses, methodology justification, scope and limitations, 
the next chapter presents the unfavourable position on NetOne in comparison with its 
competitors. It clearly shows the dire state in which NetOne is hence the need to reposition it 
if it must survive. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives a comprehensive literature review on the issues affecting the performance 
of state owned enterprises in Zimbabwe in comparison with selected developing countries 
across the globe.  The potential of Zimbabwe's SOEs to be engines of economic growth and 
exemplar of efficient public management underlines the discussions in this chapter. Relevant 
literature covering topical areas and insights of practices significant to the study are 
presented. These issues are: 
a) SOEs  and their role in the political economy 
b) SOEs and political settlements 
c) Corporate governance challenges, and 
d) Options and approaches to reforming SOEs 
 
3.2. SOES AND THEIR ROLE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
3.2.1. SOEs origins and definition 
 
Khan (2005) argues that the philosophical linchpins underlining the founding of SOEs 
emanated from World War 2 to address market deficits and to address issues of mass 
unemployment and capital shortfalls especially in developing countries. Jones and Mason 
(1982) are of the view that some of the reasons for emergence of SOEs include acquisition, or 
consolidation of political or economic power, historical heritage and inertia and pragmatic 
response to economic problems. One striking example, which befits the above scholarly point 
of view, is the Chinese economy which was once referred to as the command economy. 
China's economy however gradually changed into a mixed economy as the government 
lessened its influence and authority in them. State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are defined 
differently culminating in them having diverse definitions owing to a plethora of lens that 
academics and scholars utilise. OECD (2014) notes that SOEs are one of the largest segments 
of the economy accounting close to 20% of the total economic activities in most developing 
countries.  
 
SOEs take many forms which also contribute to them having no standard definition.  
However, SOEs are distinct in that whilst executing their commercial endeavours, they are 
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mainly characterised by government involvement in terms of percentage of ownership and or 
control. Another basic yardstick that defines SOEs is their main function of provision of basic 
services to the public. Transparency International (2013) defines SOEs as legal entities, often 
created by the state, that operate in commercial activities. SOEs can be wholly or partially 
owned by the state. According to the OECD (2014) SOEs are distinguishable since they are 
characterized by the state's significant control through full, majority, or significant minority 
ownership in them.  
 
Gildenhuys, et al (1991), define public enterprises as organizations trading goods and 
services which are wholly or partly owned or controlled by the state, but operating as 
commercial enterprises.  
 
3.2.2. SOEs in Zimbabwe 
 
In the Zimbabwean context, SOEs are understood as government owned institutions that were 
created by an act of parliament after 1980 (Dube, 2011). SOEs are understood as state organs 
or tools of public administration and they are the instruments of public policy and are 
subordinate to parliament and the executive (ibid). State public enterprises are different from 
state departments manned by line ministry officials as they have independent management 
systems. Stroh, et al. (1997), posit that SOEs are headed by board of directors who are 
accountable to the parliament since they were established by statutes which implies that the 
state accepts responsibility for activities of these institutions. In mid-1960 to mid-80s, State 
enterprises dominated the industrial sector in much of Sub-Saharan Africa (Pryor, 1976; 
Short, 1984; Nellis, 1986). In Zimbabwe, SOEs were established by the emergence of 
industrialization and colonial ideologies (Shadur, 1991; Godana and Hlatshwayo, 1998). 
 
 In the 1950s government had comprehensive control over the large parts of the Zimbabwean 
economy. Herbst (1990) contends that the settler characterized by interventionist policies, 
which benefited the colonial community to a larger extent than they did indigenous people. 
The white farmers for example, had prices for the bulk of their crops subsidized thus 
guaranteeing the purchase of these crops when they were marketed. In the same manner, 
manufacturing industries were also protected from the vagaries of the market as they took 
advantage of protectionist tariffs and the inexpensive labour provided by the labour reserve 
system (Seldam, 1986, 173). In addition to the use of controls and subsidies, the 
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aggressively developed public enterprises in areas deemed vital to the economy so that they 
may control all the profits.  
 
3.2.3. SOEs across the globe 
 
In developed and emerging countries, SOEs contribute to a substantial part of the economy's 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment (OECD, 2006). The Singaporean model of 
State Owned Enterprises has shown the world that SOEs can drive the national economy and 
they thrive in an environment where there is good corporate governance, professionalism and 
most importantly, where there is transparency and accountability in the management of 
SOEs. In Singapore where SOEs are popularly known as Government Linked Corporations 
(GLC), the management and control of these GLC is done through Temasek Holdings which 
is a commercial investment company owned by the Singapore government. Under 
Singapore's Constitution, neither the President of Singapore nor the Singapore Government is 
involved in Temasek's business decisions, except in relation to the protection of Temasek's 
past reserves. According to the Temasek Review of 2013, as of 31 March 2013, Temasek 
owned and managed a net portfolio of S$215 billion, mainly in Singapore and Asia. Based on 
the 2008 to 2013 market capitalisation data, SOEs or GLCs accounted for 37% of the stock 
market value (TZI, 2015). Literature suggests that SOEs have thrived in Singapore as a result 
of a combination of factors. The most important among them are; good corporate governance, 
transparency and accountability in the management of these GLCs.  According to TZI (2015) 
as of August 2013 Temasek had a rating of 10/10 in the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency 
Index (LMTI), making Temasek the most transparent of all Sovereign Wealth Funds around 
the World.  
 
In India, Shapiro (2009) notes that the 240 SOEs that are outside the financial sector produce 
95 percent of India's coal, 66 percent of its refined oil, 83 percent of its natural gas, and about 
one third of its finished steel and aluminium. The Indian Railways alone employs 1.6 million 
people, making it the world's largest state-owned commercial employer. Closer home, South 
Africa has over 300 publicly owned SOEs across all levels of government, the number is as 
high as 500 if subsidiaries are included (Balbuena, 2014).  In South Africa, the economic 
importance of SOEs is concentrated in the top 30 companies, with four accounting for 91% of 
the assets, 86% turnover, and 77% of SOE employment (Government of South Africa, 2011).  
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Therefore at a time when Asian countries such as China and Singapore have built strong 
economies supported by State Owned Enterprises, Zimbabwe's SOEs remained bound by 
chains of corruption, patronage and political interference, poor corporate governance and 
poor performance (TZI, 2015). It should be noted that the problem of corruption in SOEs is 
not something unique to Zimbabwe as countries such as China face similar challenges; the 
only difference being that, the Chinese government has demonstrated a commitment in 
addressing mismanagement and corruption challenges in SOEs unlike Zimbabwe. 
 
Although sources don't seem to agree on the exact contribution of SOEs to the Chinese 
economy, most sources seem to suggest that SOEs contribute more than 30% to China`s 
national GDP. The Political Economy Analysis (PEA) examines the explicit political and 
economic incentives that serve to influence or constrain the behaviour of key actors in that it 
helps one unravel the complex web of implicit interests, values and norms that serve to 
influence the decisions and actions of key stakeholders (Hadebe, 2015). 
 
3.3. STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS 
An approach informed by an appreciation of political settlements suggests that development 
outcomes, patterns of resource mobilisation and institutional change are best explained by 
understanding the underlying political constellations and their chief attributes. This, however, 
does not mean that institutions no longer matter, but rather that the specific form of 
institutions and proposed reforms in relation to them need to be consonant with or adequately 
reflect underlying political balances of power. Put another way, simply transferring Weberian 
institutions to fragile developing country contexts is unlikely to be successful where this will 
undermine or threaten the prevailing political settlement and distribution of rents.  
3.3.1. Definition of political settlements 
Political settlements have been variously defined. According to DfID (2010), political 
settlements constitute the forging of a common understanding usually among elites and that 
their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organisation of political power.  
Jonathan Di John and James Putzel (2009) add that this must be accompanied by an 
understanding of the extent to which settlements are the `bargaining outcomes among 
contending elites. Mushtaq Khan (2010) sees the reciprocal interaction between settlements 
and institutions as key, defining them as a combination of power and institutions that is 
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mutually compatible and sustainable in terms of economic and political viability.  Political 
settlements are understood as being central to state-building as they determine the 
relationships between different organised groups within society and how power is distributed 
and controlled The further argue that these often unarticulated , negotiated agreements 
usually go beyond elites to bind together state and society, provide legitimacy for rulers and 
can prevent violent conflict from occurring.  
Furthermore, recent research has emphasised that the inclusiveness of the political settlement 
as the extent to which key elites and social constituencies have been adequately incorporated 
into the prevailing political dispensation and how it affects the potential for stability. Scholars 
stress that although political settlements may adopt the structures of the modern state and be 
underpinned by a formal constitution, in practice the power relations behind the settlement 
may be very different. 
3.3.2. Forms of political settlements 
It is possible to distinguish between different forms of settlement according to certain 
defining attributes. Khan (2010) argues that the first important distinction to make is between 
political settlements in developing countries and those pertaining to capitalist, developed 
countries. The former, he explains, face crucially different determinants due to the pervasive 
sway of informal institutions based on patron-client organisations. It describes good 
governance being primarily about capability accountability and responsiveness: put another 
way, the state must be able to get things done, public institutions should respond to citizens' 
needs and public officials can be held to account for their actions or decisions. Again the 
centrality of politics is stated.  Politics determines how resources are used and policies are 
made. And politics determines who benefits.  In short, good governance is about good 
politics. But, again, here politics is understood in the more immediate sense of who is in 
power, how the electoral system operates or what policies are in place. 
3.4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES  
3.4.1. What is Corporate Governance? 
Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the direction and control of 
companies (OECD, 2005; Hontz, and Shkolnikov, 2009). It specifies the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among the company's stakeholders articulates the rules and procedures 
for making decisions on corporate affairs. Simply put, corporate governance provides the 
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structure for defining implementing, and monitoring a company's goals and objectives and for 
ensuring accountability to appropriate stakeholders (World Bank, 2014). In the main, 
corporate governance involves the establishment of structures and processes, with appropriate 
checks and balances, which enable directors to discharge their legal responsibilities (Khoza 
and Adam, 2005). More broadly, corporate governance encompasses authority, accountability 
stewardship, leadership, direction and control exercised in the organisation (Hontz, and 
Shkolnikov, 2009). Invariably, SOES that are committed good corporate governance should 
have strong Boards of Directors, effective internal controls, transparent disclosure, and well-
defined shareholder rights (World Bank, 2014).  
 
Available evidence shows that a good corporate governance system in a country is associated 
with a number of for all companies whether private or state owned. These benefits include 
among others.  
 
 Better access to external finance by firms, which in turn can lead to larger 
investments, higher growth, and greater employment creation; 
 
 Lower costs of capital and higher firm valuation, which make investments more 
attractive and lead to growth and greater employment; 
 Improved operational performance through better allocation of resources and more 
efficient management, which create wealth more generally; and  
 Reduced risk of corporate crises and scandals...and better relationships with 
stakeholders (World Bank, 2014). 
 
Good corporate governance practices possess the potential to increase productivity in and 
competitiveness of the SOEs. Good corporate governance will also help to ensure that 
services are effectively and efficiently delivered to the public (Hontz, and Shkolnikov, 2009). 
In this way, corporate governance can be deployed in Zimbabwe as a means improving the 
efficiency of state owned companies like NetOne and improving investor confidence and 
attracting low cost capital.  
 
3.4.2. SOEs’ Conflicting Goals and Objectives 
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Corporate governance challenges in SOEs nest on the structural, legal and institutional 
framework deformities. The key one being the existence of complex political goals and 
conflicting interests in SOEs. A cursory analysis of the legal and institutional framework as 
highlighted in chapter four indicates that in addition to profitability, SOEs are subject to 
broad mandates such as the public service obligations and broader social and industrial policy 
goals. Available evidence indicates that when SOEs pursue many and incongruent goals and 
objectives the indicates is that CEOs, board members and politicians tend to abuse them for 
private and political gains under the cover of their varied policy agendas and purposes. In 
Zimbabwe the governance of SOEs is carried out through multiple actors such as line 
ministries, the Ministry of Finance, Office of the President and Cabinet and a number of other 
government bodies over and above the board of directors of SOEs. To structure this complex 
web of accountabilities in order to ensure efficient decisions and good corporate 
governance is a challenge (OECD, 2005, World Bank 2006). Arguably, conflicts' between the 
state's ownership functions and its policymaking and regulatory functions arise and leave the 
SEOs vulnerable to being used to achieve short-term political goals to the detriment of its 
efficiency.  
 
Moreover, the state often assumes functions that should be carried out by the Board, such as 
appointing and dismissing the Chief Executive Officer or Managing Director and being 
involved in budgetary approvals and investment options. This gives room to unfettered 
interference as well as inconsistencies in direction and approach and has opened opportunities 
for corruption (World Bank, 2014).For instance, as part of the political goals objectives of the 
ZANU PF-led government patronage network, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) as part of 
Operation Maguta between 2002 and 2006 absorbed over 4000 members of the army. These 
members of the force were deployed to SOEs presumably so that they could be paid from 
both the SOEs and the army. Similarly, the National Railways of Zimbabwe absorbed about 
members of the military (Ministry of State Enterprises and Parastatal Internal Report, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, from 2002 up until 2012 NRZ was ordered by government to run passenger 
trains dubbed "Freedom Trains" (Hadebe, 2015). These were loss making and the 
government did not cushion the NRZ for its losses. The trains were ostensibly meant to 
provide transport for urban commuters at the height of fuel shortages in Zimbabwe. Afraid of 
citizens' riots, the government relied on SOEs for its survival 
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3.4.3. Transparency and Accountability 
 
Transparency is a characteristic of governments, companies, organizations and individuals 
that are open in the clear disclosure of information, rules, plans, processes and actions. 
Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999) and Kaufmann (2002) define transparency as the 
"increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social information, which is accessible to all 
relevant stakeholders". This perspective emphasizes not only the availability of information, 
but also its reliability and accessibility to a range of potential agents. In the context of SOEs 
transparency refers to the process of provision of relevant and accurate information to the 
public and other key stakeholders. Such information should be easily accessible, accurate and 
relevant. 
 
Accountability refers to the extent to which people, groups and institutions (known as 
principals) are able to hold government and other power holders (known as agents) 
responsible for their actions and the extent to which government and other power holders 
provide a public account of their decisions and actions. Schedler (1999) argues that 
accountability can either be vertical in that it is demanded from below by citizens or 
horizontal in institutions of the state to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of 
government and impose a requirement to report sideways. According to a study by BBC 
Media Action (2012), accountability has a two dimension definition comprising of 
answerability and enforcement. Answerability to the obligation by governments to provide 
information on what they are doing, while enforcement refers to the capacity of a principal 
either an individual citizen or a collective focus such as mass media or civil society to 
regulate the behaviour on public office bearers who do not conform to set obligations 
(Schedler, 2009). This two-dimension definition of accountability implies forcing power 
holders to justify their decisions and actions and obliging them to exercise power in 
transparent ways and subjecting power holders to the threat of sanctions (enforcement). Fox 
(2007) makes major claims about the relationships between transparency and accountability: 
 
 Opaque transparency will almost never result in any real sort of accountability; 
 Clear transparency can be understood as a form of soft accountability - both of which 
may result in institutional `answerability but not sanctions, remediation, policy 
changes, etc. and; 
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 Hard accountability may not necessarily arise from institutional `answerability'. 
 
In essence, in order to achieve `hard accountability,' there is the need to go beyond the 
discussion of transparency, to deal with both the nature of the governing regime as well as 
civil society's capacity to encourage the institutions of public accountability to do their job. 
Accountability can either be upward or downward. Literature on upward and downward 
accountability puts emphasis on how civil society organizations usually account to their 
funders and not to the communities who are beneficiaries of developmental projects.  
 
Accounting to funders is an example of upward accountability while accounting to 
communities is an example of downward accountability. It is important to note that the 
concept of upward and downward accountability also applies in the context of SOEs. 
Principals in most SOEs have a tendency of accounting to the executive or line ministries and 
seldom do they account to the public. It is downward accountability that broadens 
participation. Shana (2006) argues that the lack of transparency and accountability in state 
enterprises deters their performance and ultimately economic development. SOEs operate 
better in a democracy where the voice of the ordinary citizens will be given precedence, thus 
ensuring accountability, good governance and effective operations.  
 
Halloran (2014) notes that challenges in the transparency and accountability are rooted in 
political dynamics between states and citizens, and thus must be addressed through 
politically- informed approaches hence the analyses focuses on the interplay between public 
policy power and productive assets across society. SOEs by configuration and policy design 
are meant to be productive assets, which serve the purpose of driving state capitalism. The 
management and control fall in the hands of political actors who have political and economic 
interests in SOEs. 
 
3.4.4. Ethics and corruption 
As the broader concept of ethics is not clearly defined (Erasmus and Wordsworth, 2004), 
over the years, it has not been easy for the law makers and scholars to come up with the 
precise definition of ethics. Komba and Vermaak (2012) attempted to define ethics concept to 
mean "a set of rules that define right and wrong conduct and help individuals distinguish 
between fact and belief, decide how such issues are defined and what moral principles apply 
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to the situation." Ethics is a very important pillar of leadership and if it is applied properly in 
all the governance structures, it can yield results leading to good governance that promotes 
responsibility, transparency and accountability (Szekely and Knirsch, 2005).  
 
 The emphasis of this definition echoed the attribute of Lloyd and Mey (2010) that unethical 
employees, in this case managers will hamper a company's attempts to become globally 
competitive. Retaining unethical employees at the helm of the SOEs directorship is suicidal 
to the management of the company and may consequently results in the low morale of the 
subordinates at the grassroots level. Similarly, subordinates may be encouraged by their 
leaders within the SOEs who subscribe to ethical rules; this will impact honesty and trust in 
the company, promoting positive outcomes for competitiveness (Joseph, 2000). It is therefore 
in the light of Joseph’s assertion that indeed the application of ethics forms the crux of good 
governance. The observance of ethics is becoming more important as communities begin to 
realise its significance (Lloyd and Mey, 2010). According to Schoeman (2014), ethics should 
encompass all issues that are pertinent to accountability and transparency in the SOEs as this 
will serve as a guiding tool in the policy development within the company.  Gideon Gono, the 
former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was right when he observed that `if 
Government is to break the backbone of corruption, financial mismanagement and tendencies 
of slackness in any of its SOEs, it has to take on board principles that self- induce good 
behaviour, integrity, commitment and greater accountability by its public sector officials' 
(Gono, 2004). 
 
Various press reports and government statements report that corruption is dominant in 
SOEs in Zimbabwe It is however worrying that there have been very few cases successfully 
prosecuted despite the prevalence of grand scale political corruption in SOEs. Moyo (2014) 
points out that grand scale corruption political corruption go hand in hand and often occur 
together involving political decision-makers acting alone or in complicity with private actors 
Grand corruption is "the misuse of public power by the heads of the state, Ministers and 
senior government officials for private pecuniary gain.  
 
At the centre of the grand political corruption is power.  Power is the ability to achieve a 
desired outcome through whatever means. The `whatever means' in the definition of power 
alerts us to the fact that power has also a dark side which manifests itself in the form of 
corruption (Mutondoro and Ncube, 2015). Those who wield power to determine and decide 
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the allocations of resources in society referred to as the power elites. Through the exercise of 
political power, the power elites can administer public resources in a self-serving manner that 
excludes the majority who are supposed to be the joint beneficiaries of these resources. 
 
3.5. OPTIONS AND APPROACHES TO REFORMING STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISES 
According to Hadebe et al (2015), corporate governance deficits remain largely responsible 
for the under-performance, opacity and rent seeking behaviour in SOEs. Notwithstanding the 
glaring shortcomings of the Zimbabwean SOEs sector, there are possibilities for the sector to 
contribute meaningfully and fulfil the developmental mandate while also improving on social 
services.  
 
While acknowledging the progressive role of the State, it is equally crucial to note the 
drawbacks. The common example is the dual responsibilities of the State as both regulator 
and player and consequently, this constricts the operating space for the private sector that 
need to play its equally indispensable role in the economy. Zimbabwe embarked on 
privatization and abandoned the process and made a policy shift to the restructuring of SOEs 
(Hadebe, 2015). Of course, privatization and commercialization could be some of the options 
under the restructuring. There is no consensus among scholars on whether privatization as an 
option could enhance SOEs performance. Drawing from experiences from Brazil, Israel and 
China (Chen 2013), it is not necessarily the degree of state control but adherence to corporate 
governance standards and best practices that largely determines the performance of SOEs. In 
addition, the government should ideally be a role model in terms of market practice when it 
imposes corporate governance rules on private companies, yet as a matter of fact, SOEs are 
not generally known for having good corporate governance (Chen 2013). 
 
Unlocking the potential of SOEs should logically be premised on the current policy of SOEs 
restructuring. Therefore, the reform of SOEs is instrumental to the realization of their 
potential fruits in Zimbabwe. Restructuring initiatives must be aligned with broader long term 
vision of the state (Mokoena, 2012). According to the macro-economic blueprint, the 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIM-ASSET 2013-
2018), Zimbabwe has prioritized food security and nutrition, infrastructure and public utilities 
development, value addition and beneficiation as well as social services and poverty 
22  
eradication. While ZIM-ASSET points to an even stronger involvement of the state in 
economic activities, it includes the significant role of the private sector, especially through 
public-private partnerships. The blueprint also speaks of improving public administration, 
corporate governance and public accountability in SOEs. It is these national goals and ideals 
that should ideally guide the restructuring of SOEs and benchmarking their performance 
thereafter. That further buttresses the urgency of SOEs reform if the envisaged national 
developmental goals are anything to go by.  
 
It has been noted that restructuring of Zimbabwe's SOEs was conceived of as an alternative to 
privatization that had earlier been embarked on but not completed [Balbuena 2014].The State 
Enterprises Restructuring Agency (SERA) formerly the Privatization Agency of Zimbabwe 
(PAZ) is mandated to coordinate the restructuring process. Restructuring is the corporate 
management term for the act of reorganizing the legal, ownership, operational, or other 
structures of a company for the purpose of improving its viability and profitability.  
 
According to Hadebe (2015) the dual roles of ownership and regulation by the State have 
generally created problems for the management, performance and transparency in SOEs the 
world over. The trend recently has been to Separate these roles, since ideally Government 
should not be involved in management of businesses'[Chen 2013:23] but should attend to 
policy matters.  
 
3.5.1. Option 1: Separation of roles and responsibilities 
This approach has had successes in Singapore through the Temasek Holdings [Chen 2013]. 
Already Zimbabwe has in some cases structured a number of SOEs into smaller business 
oriented units under a wholly state owned holding company. Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority (ZESA) is one such example. As a key aspect of reform of SOEs, analysts like 
Hadebe (2015) argue that there must be a strong policy towards this separation of roles. The 
separation of roles could help improve transparency and accountability and enhance 
performance towards set targets. The separation of roles could facilitate the balance between 
commercial and public service obligations. 
 




Several scholars argue that at every level of the reform process, it is imperative to reflect on 
the very purpose of SOEs and how best they could achieve their stated mandates. In addition 
to their strategic role in the national development agenda, SOEs are meant to avail essential 
services at affordable prices to the citizens. Needless to say that the reforms that solely focus 
on cost recovery and commercial viability of SOEs may compromise public service 
obligations and the national development agenda. For example, the commercialization of 
ZESA resulted in massive increase in electricity tariff rates [Zhou and Masunungure, 2006], 
while in other instances it was accompanied by massive job losses. For any public policy 
implemented, the unintended consequences should be equally factored in the planning just 
like the intended outcomes. The Government has an obligation to protect and guarantee 
adequate access for citizens to important public services (Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya, 
1996). Most often, such reforms are done under severe fiscal constraints with pressure to 
recover costs; hence, they tend to undermine social services. Reforms that are not balanced in 
terms of commercial and public service responsibilities could most likely result in deepening 
rather than alleviating poverty. 
 
3.5.3. Option 3:  Commercialization  
 
The commercialization of SOEs is another option recommended for reform of the sector. 
Most countries from time to time commercialize certain SOEs. It is the executive's 
prerogative to choose the candidates for commercialization after due diligence and related 
preliminary considerations. Protagonists of this approach argue that it’s not about which 
public entity to be commercialized but how best it could be done for maximum benefits to the 
nation. One reason cited for the lack of viability of commercialized SOEs in Zimbabwe was 
lack of discretionary autonomy commensurate with the new status' [Zhou and Masunungure, 
2006] as ministerial interference continues. Since part of the reasons for commercialization 
would be to achieve profitability through improved management and corporate governance, 
continued political interference defeats that objective. Commercialization objectives would 
be defeated if the government persists in exercising direct controls on pricing, investment, 
hiring and firing as is usually the case in Zimbabwe [Zhou and Masunungure2006]. There is 
need for a shift in mind-sets and acknowledge that bureaucrats have not succeeded in running 




3.5.4. Option 4: Privatization  
Whilst some countries like Singapore have successfully privatised their SOEs including 
listing them on the stock exchange, for Zimbabwe the privatization option has been handled 
cognizant of the possible negative attitudes. That is understandable, considering the 
undesirable consequences from some previous SOEs privatization efforts. While it is logical 
that the Government would be reluctant to exercise this option due to historical reasons, 
economic circumstances could compel the authorities to exercise the privatization option for 
selected SOEs. Already a number of SOEs were privatized like Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited 
(DZL), Cotton Company (Cottco), Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ), Zimbabwe 
Reinsurance (ZimRe) and Zimbabwe Tourism Group of Companies [Zhou and Masunungure, 
2006]. Of course, there are a number of short comings learnt that should be avoided and 
guarded against in the future. Privatization is usually fraught with corruption as it provides 
rich and easy pickings to the politically connected' [Zhou and Masunungure, 2006], 
especially the very government officials meant to safeguard national assets. It should be 
noted that `privatization of state companies in Zimbabwe drained more funds than it 
generated' [Zhou and Masunungure, 2006] largely because of inadequate prior preparations. 
Before a privatization option is exercised, it is important to do the necessary research so that 
the process is evidence-based. The recent ZISCO-ESSAR deal is one such example of ill-
preparedness, lack of evidence-based policy and lack of transparency in contract making. 
Hadebe (2015) argues that similar cases elsewhere have prejudiced countries of potential 
revenue. Each sector has its peculiar operating environment and a one-size fit all approach is 
not advisable. Nonetheless, there should be clarity in policy direction in the sector where an 
SOE is privatized to minimize negative consequences.  
 
Apart from a clear privatization law and sector specific policies prior to disposal of SOEs, 
privatization shall remain unpopular with some citizens and stakeholders for the negative 
consequences like job losses. Privatization is meant to inject the needed investment and 
retooling in most of the SOEs and it should facilitate the redistributive agenda. The 
indigenization policy as previously implemented has been selective of the certain elites 
without it being broad based and inclusive in terms of gender representation, social class or 
regional balance (TZI, 2015). For example, workers have in most cases been outclassed by 
management while some regions of the country hardly got an opportunity to participate in the 
privatization of SOEs. There cannot be a prescription to the type of privatization whether it is 
management buyout or contracting-out or franchising or any other model. According to TIZ 
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(2015), what is fundamental is the tightening of the process to make it transparent, fair and 
goal-oriented. In Zimbabwe, this could be partly achieved with a revamp of the State 
Procurement Board which is actually prioritized in ZIM-ASSET. Strengthening the State 
Procurement Board and anti-corruption agencies like the Anti-Corruption Commission is one 
part of the solution; the other part is curtailing political interference through ministerial 
directives in the tendering process. This could avoid the embarrassing court cases against 
ministries that often accompany privatization of SOEs in Zimbabwe.  
 
3.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed literature regarding the ownership and performance of SOEs across the 
world. What stands out is that despite the political system it is the approach to manage the 
SOEs that make them succeed or fail. Singapore gives a good example of the successful 














CHAPTER 4:  EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF STATE ENTERPRISES AND 
PRARASTATALS, THE ZIMBABWEAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS, THE AND 
THE MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter provides a framework within which to elaborate upon the most pertinent themes 
in the study NetOne’s performance by highlighting the problem of political settlements, 
access to capital, corporate governance and the consequent lack of accountability and 
transparency in the management of SOEs in Zimbabwe.  
The chapter covers the following areas: 
 Zimbabwe’s contemporary political settlement  
 A brief history of SOEs in Zimbabwe , and 
 A brief history of the evolution of the mobile telecommunications sector in Zimbabwe 
 
It concludes that SEOs’ performance has historically been affected by the predatory as well 
personalised patrimonial system leading poor corporate governance and unethical practices. 
4.2. THE ZIMBABWEAN POLITICAL STELLEMENT 
4.2.1. The Zimbabwe political system 
Upon independence in 1980, the Zimbabwe political system was dominated by ZANU PF 
until 2000 when the labour backed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) put a 
formidable challenge to ZANU PF’s hegemony. It is particularly worrying that the focus of 
the ruling ZANU PF has been political survival rather than transformation in the productive 
structure of its economy with critics arguing that the multi-party system in Zimbabwe has 
become increasingly characterized by, and is further embedding, patron client rather than 
democratic forms of politics within what Levy (2012) terms a `competitive clientelist' 
settlement. Particularly since the 2000s, elections have been highly contested, with the two 
main parties having each won and lost elections by the narrowest of margins and in some 
instances have necessitated two rounds of polling (run-off) to determine the winner 
culminating in the formation of the All-Inclusive Government between 2008 and 2013.   
The current party system reflects a growing political polarization, which is both shaped by 
and sustains a patronage system that has penetrated all levels of government and which 
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undermines the nation's already weak institutions. There remain significant formal and 
substantive deficits in the country's governance arrangement, including constitutional 
arrangements characterized by dominant personalised patrimonialism, excessive 
presidentialism, weak checks and balances, and lack of effective devolution of authority to 
democratic local government.  
Close observers suggest that the general level of elite consensus over the formal rules of the 
game concerning multi-party elections obscures a virulent level of contestation for power 
behind the scenes, whereby an increasingly defining feature of the Zimbabwe political system 
is the growing elite competition for power and the high tendency for inter-elite factionalism. 
Power in Zimbabwe is concentrated in the party hierarchy, membership of which offers 
access to rents and widespread patronage opportunities and networks. As a result, intense 
intra-party competition has characterized party leadership contests in the two main parties, 
often triggering the coalescing of elites and grassroots interests, actors and players behind 
certain individuals. This intensely competitive elite struggle for political power and bloc 
forming has not only made the ruling elite more vulnerable to clientelist interests, but also 
contributes to the ever growing level of political polarisation in the country. 
The highly contested and condemned nature of the country's electoral process, and 
the constitutionally imposed five year term limit, have combined to generate strong pressures 
for the ruling ZANU PF  and its elites to answer to the short term socio-economic needs of 
voters and their supporters, and the needs of their own short-term political survival. This 
enduring political pressure has informed competitive patronage and clientelist-based politics, 
which sustain and underlie the policy choices and preferences of the ruling elites, as well as 
the interests of the ruling coalitions within the parties. As such, the degree of formalization 
now witnessed within the electoral process does not extend far beyond the actual mechanics 
of polling themselves.  
 The underlying logic of a competitive clientelist political system is a structured mutual 
patron-client relationship. Indeed, this relationship has dominated the politics of developing 
countries everywhere in the world (van de Walle, 2009). The particular form of this 
relationship and resulting politics and development, however, vary across different 
democratic systems. The country's political system has developed into a source of patronage 
where parties provide job opportunities  for the ‘boys and girls’ or the more politically correct 
term party foot-soldiers in their bid to win election. It must be noted that the patron-client 
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political relations that characterize the Zimbabwean political system are not new. This 
relationship has characterized  
Zimbabwe's political development since independence has been volatile becoming more 
manifest during the turn of the millennium. For some observers, this suggests that 
competitive clientelism in Zimbabwe (as elsewhere) derives its underpinning from deep 
structural roots. These include the failure to establish a formal economy large enough to 
displace the informal economy (Khan, 2010), universal public organisations unable to 
personalized and partial ones (North et al., 2009) and the lack of programmatic forms of party 
politics to replace clientelist ones (Levy, 2012). Such a political system party foot-soldiers 
expect to disproportionately benefit from the reallocation of public resources: higher ranking 
officials such as party officials and financiers pursue rent-seeking and influence peddling, 
while the ruling party governs not in the national interest but in order to returning to power in 
the next election.  Thus, the political strategy structures a rentier mutual expectation in which 
patrons distribute resources in return for political support. So for example, in Zimbabwe, for 
public officials like heads of SOEs and top civil servants and unemployed youths belonging 
to ZANU PF a political party has become a source of economic empowerment.  
The consolidation of patronage-driven politics, some analysts note, has skewed political 
incentives and government spending in favour of influential interest groups and public 
investment with short-term electoral pay-offs as opposed to investments in long-term and 
sustainable public goods delivery aimed at broad poverty alleviation. Competition for rents 
through corruption has become more pervasive. There is considerable corruption in the 
Zimbabwean public life. Rent seeking behaviour, particularly among the country's ruling and 
bureaucratic elites, is pervasive. Contestation and acceptance of patronage in the public sector 
and state-owned enterprises has gained ground becoming a central feature of the country's 
political economy. Patronage and the associated distribution of the spoils of state power have 
become the primary pay-off for campaign and party donors as well as a means of securing 
new financiers. 
This tendency has caused most Zimbabweans to consider corruption to be the major factor 
that is holding back the country's development. The public sector, which is supposed to serve 
as a vital agency driving sustainable developmental agenda, has also not witnessed any 
meaningful efficiency and effectiveness and is thereby becoming another source of corrupt 
practices.  
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In terms of policy formulation, decisions regarding where to spend the country's resources by 
this coalition have primarily looked the incentive structure available to them before 
embarking on any policy intervention or reforms. At the levels of individuals and groups, the 
ruling elite have often ensured warped party ideologies and beliefs take precedent when 
deciding on how policies and programmes for development are conceived. However, such 
processes are leveraged upon by leaders with extreme power and grip within the ruling elite 
to entrench their power for political survival. This pervasive experience has meant that the 
ruling elites within the ruling party have pursued and implemented policies that have a short 
time horizon do not significantly shift the allocation of resources towards building productive 
sectors and are often plagued by problems of enforcement. The compounding factors 
resulting in this phenomenon include high degrees of vulnerability in power due to a strong 
opposition party, by strong lower-level factions within the ruling coalition due to their 
importance in winning elections, and by a high degree of fragmentation among the ruling 
elite, not excluding a weak domestic capitalist class and arguably, low  inflows of foreign aid. 
 One example of this glaring short-term political interest-driven policy formulation relates to 
the political party financing during elections. The code of conduct and other regulatory 
frameworks of the political parties regarding elections in Zimbabwe  
acknowledge party financing as the most important political resource that drives party 
vibrancy and competitiveness. However it forbids parties from being sponsored by non-
Zimbabweans. In spite of this, there have been many instances where political parties have 
grossly abused these provisions because the extent of contributions and the identity of the 
donors have remained a closely guarded secret. 
4.2.2. SOEs and the Zimbabwean political settlement 
As noted in the above section , both Rhodesia and Zimbabwe drew on the British precedence, 
in the establishment and development of SOEs, and both the colonial and post-colonial states 
reduced these enterprises largely into agencies of patronage, therefore, rendering them loss-
making and parasitic organs or tools of public administration. More importantly, this study 
confirms that there have been lame attempts at reforming SOEs in Zimbabwe towards the 
kind of best practices" which the former colonial power (Britain) - and many other countries 
the world over - have been introducing ever since the illustrated in the Treasury Internal 
Paper (1996), already referred to in the foregoing.  
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The new post-independent government sought to use the SOEs sector as one of the agencies 
through which to address the colonial question, especially in the socioeconomic sector. This 
was not new in the history of post-independence: for example, Zambia had pursued ever 
since the Mulungushi Declaration of 1967, a mixture of nationalization and SOEs as a means 
towards indigenizing the economy; and Tanzania instituted its own kind of "African 
Socialism" as the model in an economy in which there was a very small private sector, giving 
rise to a plethora of SOEs that pervaded almost every aspect of economic and social activity.  
Clearly, the problems and tribulations attendant to the SOEs sector in Zimbabwe reflect, as 
do many other factors that are symptoms of the same, the nature and character of the post-
colonial state: as one modelled on the conventional national bourgeois democratic state but 
without the national bourgeoisie (which should relatively be independent of the state for its 
survival as a class); and therefore, reducing the state itself into a predatory one for a parasitic 
class of political leaders and bureaucrats, as the theatre for primitive accumulation. Not 
surprisingly, the SOE sector has been the agency for the politics and economics of patronage, 
viewed simply as the feeding trough for the new bureaucratic comprador bourgeoisie that has 
thrived on its links with the party/state. This includes some retired politicians and/or former 
military personnel. Therefore, the increasing number of such persons in the boards and 
managements of SOEs in Zimbabwe also reflects the nature of the state which has been 
captured by ZANU PF party members and security forces who have correspondingly relied 
on coercion/violence (or the threat of it) and patronage. Overall, this study will have to 
consider whether there could be meaningful transparency and accountability in the 
management of state enterprises without the reform of the Zimbabwean State itself.  
Dawson and Kelsall (2011) note that over the years, these SOEs increasingly changed in 
character from production and marketing mechanisms into sites of political patronage as 
ZANU PF appointed boards were based less on technical competence than on clientelism. 
After the Willowgate Scandal of 1988, patronage politics rather than economic success 
appeared to be the driving ethos within the SOEs. For example, in 2005 SOEs were ordered 
to erect stands and pay rentals at ZANU PF’s congress thereby contributing to the costs of the 
event (Dawson and Kelsall ibid). 
4.3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEOs IN ZIMBABWE 
4.3.1. SOEs in the Zimbabwean political economy 
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The idea of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Zimbabwe has its origins in the British 
system of governance, particularly the socialist ideals of the early twentieth century and the 
related development of the concept and practice of the "welfare state". SOEs were conceived 
as agencies for the delivery of services to the public, hence the term "public service". In 
essence, they were part of the ideological superstructure that purported to conceal the blatant 
class nature of the capitalist state, behind organs designed both to ameliorate at least some of 
the adverse effects of capitalism and provide (state- sponsored) services to the public at large.  
Therefore, in both ideological and theoretical terms, SOEs were viewed as essential tools of 
control, economic planning and development. They are, according to the protagonists and 
ideologues of the welfare state, a means of industrial power and influence, economic self-
reliance implementation of policy, safeguarding public interests, maintenance and 
enhancement of morality, thus their failure is not an option. As this study illustrates, the 
history of SOEs has, in practice, been far from such lofty ideals, not only in Zimbabwe where 
the situation in this regard is pathetic if not pathological, but also in Britain itself where this 
sector was virtually transformed ever since the 1990's into viable business ventures.  
In a Treasury Internal Paper (1996), it is recorded that the SOEs process involved the 
reconstruction of departmental trading activities into profit oriented, state owned, limited 
liability companies. A number of pre-existing statutory corporations were also made subject 
to the SOEs accountability provisions. The Treasury was a key adviser to government 
throughout the SOE process. This included the inception of the policy to establish state 
trading activities on a commercial footing, through to the detail of the SOEs legislation and 
the monitoring provisions. Subsequently, the Treasury has been responsible for monitoring 
the performance of SOEs on behalf of shareholding ministries and devoting and 
implementing privatization policy.  
In the colonial era, economic policies were characterised by unprecedented investment in 
physical and social infrastructure for whites. The state used SOEs to exercise control over 
strategic economic activities, and investing in areas deemed unattractive to the private sector, 
like the Cold Storage Commission and the Rhodesia Iron and Steel Company (Zhou and 
Masunungure, 2006). The majority of the SOEs were wholly owned state monopolies and the 
state controlled the prices of goods and services provided by the SOEs. The prices were 
pegged at low levels, making it difficult for the parastatals to recover their operational costs. 
As a result, they received heavy subsidies (Zhou and Masunungure, 2006). 
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 This is the situation that was inherited by the new black government at independence. The 
government adopted the policy of Growth with Equity in 1981, in order to address the 
inequities between blacks and whites, and in line with its redistributive policies, more 
parastatals were established, e.g. Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO), 
National Social Security Agency (NSSA), National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), 
and existing ones were expanded. From 1980 to 2015, the number of SOEs rose from 20 to 
78, with some being wholly owned state monopolies (Zhou and Masunungure 2006).  
The Rhodesian experience with SOEs was integral to the political economy of white settler 
colonialism. The Land Apportionment Act (1930) constituted the backbone of economy 
which thrived for the benefit of the settlers, at the direct expense - and with surplus drawn 
from their labour and dispossession - colonized people; and such State Enterprises as the 
Cold Storage Commission Abattoirs, Cotton Research Industrial Boards, Maize Control 
Board and Rhodesian Iron Steel, were not only vehicles for the protection of the white settler 
bourgeoisie against both the emergent indigenous middle classes in the 1940's and 1950's, but 
even the international capital. This tendency was reinforced during the UDI era (1965-1979) 
when the sanctions against the Smith regime caused the latter to turn to a variety of import-
substitution and sanctions-busting activities, out of which emerged such quasi-state 
enterprises as TA Holdings and Mashonaland Holdings, reflecting as they did a close 
relationship between the white agrarian bourgeoisie, industrial capital and a new class of 
white comprador elements some of whom have survived into, and continue to thrive in, 
postcolonial Zimbabwe.  
Apart from the SOEs, the entire economic system was designed as an enclave for the 
protection, benefit and patronage of the white settler community. The post-white settler 
colonial situation was characterized by continuity rather than change from onwards. In other 
words, the structure of the economy and most of its vestiges - income, wealth distribution, 
land ownership - intact and buttressed by the Lancaster House Constitution which, inter alia, 
had political and economic safeguards for the former while settlers in post - independence 
Zimbabwe, initially for the first 10 years but, in practice, well beyond that, even though a 
sizeable black middle joined this echelon of the few.  
Zimbabwe has done little or nothing to learn from the experiences of such countries as India 
which has transformed most of its SOEs into dynamic engines of growth and development; 
and China, which has developed an amazing form of State Capitalism out of SOEs which had 
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become mostly agencies of patronage and stagnation. By comparison, Zimbabwe's model was 
a mixture of the continuity of the settler colonial economy in its essential aspects, and a 
"socialist" slant through the democratization of the social sector - education, health social 
services. Generally, the developments were no less than revolutionary in import. 
The SOEs consist of public corporations established through Parliamentary Acts and state 
companies incorporated under the Private Companies Act. State enterprises promotional 
development and commercial objectives, with each set of objectives varying according to the 
nature of the enterprise. As others like Sikwila (2014), have observed, some SOEs are 
regulatory bodies while others play a dual role as both regulatory and commercial. Most of 
these SOEs are incorporated under the Companies Act, and all account for approximately 40 
percent of GDP.  
The role of the SOEs as outlined in the Zimbabwe government publication entitled 
Zimbabwe: First Decade 1980 -1990 was to provide the state with a means and agency 
through which the state could intervene in economic and social sectors. SOEs were 
established under different legal forms, some through a special act of parliament, some 
through the companies act, and others as joint ventures with private companies, with the state 
having a majority ownership (51% and above). A Parastatals Commission was put in charge 
of all SOEs from 1988 to 1990, and after its dissolution, each state enterprise or parastatals 
was managed by a board whose members were appointed by the responsible minister (Zhou 
and Masunungure, 2006).  
SOES continued to receive subsidies, with no improvement in their financial performance 
(Zhou and Masunungure, 2006). This subsidy dependence syndrome became a heavy burden 
on the fiscus. Zhou et al (2006) also point out that besides handouts from the Treasury, SOEs 
also enjoyed hidden subsidies in the form of tax exemptions, cheap government-guaranteed 
credit facilities and below market price purchases from the government. The state continued 
to set prices for SOEs’ goods and services, and inordinate delays were experienced in 
approving price increases. Zhou (2001) cites instances where the government took twenty-six 
months to approve a request for a tariff increase by the National Railways of Zimbabwe, and 
Air Zimbabwe had to wait three months before it could increase its fares. This led to huge 
deficits by SOEs. Losses were also incurred as a result of social mandates of some SOEs, 
which were not economically viable but beneficial to society as a whole. 
4.3.2. A Legacy of Patronage and Mismanagement 
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As originally conceived under the British system at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Minister of Government was the central factor in the existence and operations of an SOE, as 
prescribed by the respective Act of Parliament. As such, the Minister (and his/ her ministry) 
presided over the SOE, was responsible for regulating the sector by creating a favourable 
atmosphere for industry, and ensuring a competitive advantage in generating profits for the 
public good. So, the parent ministries acted as shareholders to SOEs, on behalf of 
government and, in turn, for the benefit of the citizens as a whole: to ensure growth and 
development and, therefore, mandated to appoint Board members and managers of the SOEs, 
and even deciding on price setting.  
However, as the revelations of Justice Smith Commission (Hadebe et al, 2015),  testify, this 
principle of corporate governance was converted into a blank cheque of ministerial 
responsibility", or a virtual licence for unbridled political patronage, accompanied by blatant 
disdain for the most basic of corporate governance and managerial requirements for SOEs. 
Among other factors, the Report revealed that the SOEs had virtually emerged, ever since 
1952, monopoly purchasers, processors and suppliers entities, controlling over 95 per cent of 
the domestic market for its products. Not surprisingly, SOEs were operating in deficit, funded 
by state subsidies. The annual trading account deficit for SOEs increased dramatically after 
independence in April 1980, rising from 7 per cent of sales in the year to June 1980, to over 
50 per cent in the late 1980s.  
The Justice Smith Commission had been established to deal with overbearing ministerial 
responsibility and its evils which include inter-alia patronage and corruption and extrapolated 
in practice to broader corporate governance issues under the Parastatals Commission itself 
which was established in 1988, under the Chairmanship of Ibbo Mandaza (former Secretary 
and subsequently deputy chairman of the Public Service Commission) and reporting directly 
to the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe.  Unfortunately, the President dissolved the 
Parastatals Commission in January, 1990, with the words to this effect: the Commission had 
done a good job but this was now over. With the advantage of hindsight over the last twenty 
four years since the dissolution of the Parastatals Commission it is now obvious that the 
Zimbabwean state, like most post - colonial social formations, cannot exist without the 
component of patronage implicit in the literal interpretation of ministerial responsibility. 
Indeed, the Parastatals Commission had been appointed so as to curb the excesses attendant 
to this; as it turned out, it was losing battle from the outset. As this study reveals, the SOE 
sector in Zimbabwe has been a major agency through which patronage, a feature implicit in 
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all political orders, has escalated to such excesses as to become synonymous with corruption 
mismanagement and the virtual collapse of most of these enterprises. Not to mention the 
aftermath of the Parastatals Commission, from 1990 to present day, wherein confusion and 
competing interests within Ministries themselves, and between the latter and other regulatory 
bodies such as Cabinet, the Inter-ministerial Committee on Commercialization and 
Privatization, the National Economic Planning Commission and the Department of State 
Enterprises and Indigenization. Currently, the combined influence of ZANU PF itself 
(through the Head of State in particular) and the Office of the President Cabinet (OPC) - in 
which, today, there are many Permanent Secretaries or similar rank - accounts for most key 
decisions SOEs in Zimbabwe. 
The inherent contradictions of the abuse of SOEs for political advantage at the expense of 
economic realities inevitably resulted in institutions that became less and less efficient even 
as sources of rents let alone as service providers. Since the SOEs operated as short-horizon 
and centralised sites of rent-seeking, the cost of maintaining these grew substantially as 
profitability declined, perpetuating underdevelopment.  
4.3.3. New Developments on SOEs Reform in Zimbabwe 
Recent developments show that the government of Zimbabwe is on paper still pursuing 
commercialisation and privatisation of SOEs. The government has since produced a code of 
corporate governance for parastatals (Daily News, 2 March 2013) as well as a restructuring 
manual to guide state owned enterprises in management and restructuring processes (The 
Herald , 23 November 2013). It is also interesting to note the following remarks by the 
Minster of State Enterprises and Parastatals. He is quoted in the Herald of 7 May 2012 as 
saying that most SOEs were run by incompetent managers, as evidenced by their failure to 
come up with meaningful restructuring proposals. The same newspaper on 10 March 2012 
also highlights the fact that about seven SOEs had been operating for more than two years 
without boards. This means that SOEs will either be privatised or commercialised. It is 
therefore my opinion that an empowered and re-oriented SOEs management regime will 
greatly assist the SOEs earmarked for commercialisation and privatisation to achieve break-
even and even profitability, thereby making them attractive to investors. 
Although the new Constitution of Zimbabwe [Amendment No. 20 of 2013] demands that all 
public agencies report Zimbabwean citizenry on their performance there is lack of 
transparency and accountability since the company does not publish its results for public 
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scrutiny. This researcher was also denied the full list of board members from 2002 to date 
and had to rely on newspaper articles to get the names of the past and present board members. 
In 2010 the government through its push for the one size fits all approach to Results Based 
Management (RBM) and the fad Performance Contracts System responded to the corporate 
governance challenges faced by the country through the adoption of various corporate 
governance codes elsewhere around the world. It therefore developed the Corporate 
Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals (CGFSOE) of 2010 and National Code of 
Corporate Governance (NCCG) in 2015. A bill for the Public Sector Corporate Governance 
Act is currently under debate in Parliament. 
 The frameworks focus on impartial appointment of board of directors, procedures and 
meetings, strategic planning, budgeting, performance contracts, financial reporting and 
production of audited accounts. The Companies Act [Chapter 24:03] as well as other various 
acts governing the conduct of all registered companies compel them to abide by good 
governance practices.  
The Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] (PFMA) gives legal effect to some 
provisions of the corporate governance framework.  Section 50 of the PFMA legally compels 
every public entity to adhere to the principles of sound corporate governance policies, 
procedures and practices. The PFMA imposes various penalties on officers of the SOEs who 
fail to observe certain provisions of the act as well as the NCCG and its predecessor the 
CGFSOE which unfortunately have not been implemented by SEOs including NetOne. A 
Corporate Governance Bill is currently being discussed in Parliament but it remains to be 
seen whether the law if passed will backed by political will to ensure its enforcement. 
4.4. EVOLUTION, GROWTH AND POLITICS OF THE ZIMBABWE MOBILE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
In colonial Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) 
was a monopoly in the provision of posts and telecommunications services. It was formed in 
1968 as a statutory body to take over telecommunications services from the police under the 
Ministry of Posts. An Act of Parliament was passed in 1970 to create the Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) and was governed by the Posts Telecommunications 
Services Act [Chapter 250] and the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation Act [Chapter 
251]. The management and control PTC was bureaucratic with the successive Ministers 
having the final decisions in its operations. 
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Mobile telecommunications services were introduced in Zimbabwe in 1996 when first 
attempts to liberalise the telecommunications sector were made. Due to patrimonial politics, 
the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry was hurriedly done in Zimbabwe 
through the Judiciary instead of the Executive, following a lawsuit by the founder of Econet 
Wireless Zimbabwe. Hitherto the Government of Zimbabwe has failed to institute necessary 
reforms on the successor entities of the PTC in order to allow them to compete in the new 
liberalised telecommunications environment.  
With sheer reluctance in response to evolving technological developments and legal 
challenges, the Government liberalized the sector in the late 1990s. In the mid-1990s Strive 
Masiyiwa the founder of Econet Wireless Zimbabwe heralded the idea of setting up a mobile 
cellular telephony business in partnership with the then PTC. Upon failing to persuade PTC 
to set up a Joint venture Masiyiwa struck out on his own (Dawson and Kendall, 2011). While, 
Strive Masiyiwa Econet Wireless Zimbabwe was fighting in the courts to get a mobile 
licence. Telecel was the first private mobile cellular operator in 1997. Econet Wireless 
Zimbabwe was finally granted a licence by The Supreme Court in 1998 completely ending 
government monopoly in the sector.  
 The industry now has four mobile network operators namely; Econet Wireless, NetOne 
Cellular (Pvt) Limited, Telecel Zimbabwe and Tel-One (Pvt) Limited. There are however, 
three operators since Tel-One has failed to offer mobile telecommunication services since it 
was granted a licence in 2011.  The industry has over the years phenomenally grown with 
Econet Wireless emerging as an oligopoly owing to the slow growth of the other two 
operators. 
According to sources at NetOne, their company was the first to be licenced in 1996 and 
launched its operations with 500 post-paid lines during the World Solar Summit in September 
1996 in Harare. NetOne is one of the four successor agencies all wholly owned by the 
Government following the unbundling of the PTC in the late 1990s. The others are Tel-One 
(Pvt) Limited, Zimbabwe Posts (ZIMPOST) and the Postal and Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ). No private players were allowed to offer 
similar services in competition with PTC. Since it was a monopoly it managed to extend its 
footprint to all cities, towns, tourist resort areas, mining farming and rural areas and for the 
following ten or more years boasted of the widest network coverage in Zimbabwe. In 
interviews conducted with NetOne management, it was revealed that NetOne needs about 
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US$570m to put up 3 000 base stations, up from the current figure of 750 base stations, at 
average cost of US$250 000 per rural base station. It also requires a lot of capital for optic 
fibre infrastructure and to upgrade its value services like OneWallet, its money transfer 
platform. 
Econet Wireless is the market leader and is also one of the largest companies listed on the 
Zimbabwe Exchange. In 2009, the company became the first operator to launch mobile data 
services under 3G technology and began building an extensive optic network through its 
subsidiary, Liquid Telecom.  
Survival and success the mobile telecommunications industry is characterized by the ability 
to adapt to the changing profile and higher user expectations on the one hand and a rapidly 
changing technology environment on the other. In recent years, competition amongst the 
brands: Econet, NetOne and Telecel have intensified driven by increased demand for mobile 
telecom services which is a phenomenal trend especially in developing countries. All the 
mobile operators are 100% digitalized and offer 2G, GPRS, EDGE, and 3G services. With 
the basic mobile telecommunications services relatively identical, consumers face a complex 
task of selecting their preferred mobile telecom brand amongst the given alternatives. 
According to www econet.co.zw, Econet Wireless Zimbabwe was incorporated in 1994 and 
launched its full scale operations in 1998 and boasted of a host of brands with Ecocash its 
mobile money transfer platform and Econet Broadband the internet service provider topping 
the list. 
Whilst literature on the shift in market share and positions is dominant in the local press, 
scholarly articles on the determinants of brand preferences is somehow scarce. 
Notwithstanding the major drivers for the use of mobile telecommunications services has for 
the past 19 years been the consumers’ need for faster and efficient telecommunications 
services emanating from the slow growth, accessibility and affordability of the traditional 
fixed telephone lines.  
Competition in the mobile telecommunications services sector has intensified over the past 
few years since the adoption of a multi-currency financial system in early 2009 with the 
subsequent launch of new products and services such as internet broadband services, mobile 
money transfer platforms and mobile banking services. In addition, the aggressive 
promotional activities by all the telecom players such as bonus calls, free SMS services, 
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reduced tariffs at selected times confirm assertions by market analysts who predict even 
stiffer competition in the preceding years.  
4.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the history of SOEs in Zimbabwe and how the Zimbabwean 
political settlements played a part in the development of the telecommunications industry, the 
introduction of the highly contested mobile telecommunications industry and the birth of 
NetOne. It is evident that NetOne is a product of centralised state control whose ownership 
structure undoubtedly has a bearing on the performance on of the company as will be 


















CHAPTER 5: EVIDENCE OF NETONE'S UNDERPERFORMANCE  
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses NetOne's performance in terms of market share, financial performance 
and contribution to employment in comparison with Econet Wireless and Telecel over the 
years. It also provides the company’s financial position in terms of debtors and creditors. It 
concludes that overall, NetOne has not done well despite isolated cases of success. 
5.2. MARKET SHARE 
This subsection provides NetOne’s historical market share in comparison with other 
operators in the industry and reveals its low competitiveness. Statistics given in tables 3 to 5 
below obtained from the sector regulator, POTRAZ show that NetOne (Pvt) Ltd used to be 
the sector leader with 72 127 subscribers in 1999 while its competitors were below 70 000. 
The figures show that NetOne has played second fiddle to Econet and has been exchanging 
the second position with Telecel in between the years, only to completely upstage Telecel 
Zimbabwe in 2014 owing to threats to close Telecel by government for failure to abide by the 
contentious indigenization policy which led to it losing a substantial number of subscribers. 
At the end of 2014, NetOne (Pvt) Ltd had around 3 million subscribers (27.1%) while Econet 
Wireless had 6.4 million subscribers (54,7%) and Telecel had around 2 million (18.2%).  As 
shown in the tables 1-3 below, between 2009 and 2013, NetOne was number three out of 
three in terms of subscribers. 
Table 1: Market share 1997-2004 
Company 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Telecel  -                 
574  
           
53,079  
           
82,786  
           
84,690  
           
85,084  
           
95,286  
         
130,152  
NetOne          
20,492  
         
60,161  
           
72,217  
           
89,949  
           
91,805  
         
114,295  
         
118,295  
         
122,139  
Econet  -   -             
63,286  
           
93,706  
         
137,512  
         
140,462  
         
151,084  
         
173,606  
Total           
20,492  
         
60,735  
         
188,582  
         
266,441  
         
314,007  
         
339,841  
         
364,665  
         
425,897  
 
Table 2: Market share 2005-2010 




          
140,000  
         
156,698  




             
451,063  
         
1,270,562  
NetOne           
166,000  
        
  215,488  
              
331,254  
             
340,189  
             
347,293  




          
341,000  
        
  477,459  
            
  648,908  








        
  647,000  
         
 849,645  
        
  1,225,908  
        
  1,276,122  
       
4,013,192  
         
7,204,800  
 
Table 3: Market share 2011-2014 


































5.3. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
This subsection presents NetOne is financial performance by looking at revenues from 2001- 
2014 as well as the Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) and profits from 2009-2014 as shown 
in tables 4 – 11 below. 
 The ARPU is generally a revenue growth indicator as a result of promotions and 
supplemental services provided by a company. It is also used to measure profitability of an 
operator. 
 
Table 4:  Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) (US$) 2009-2014 
 
Company 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Telecel 153  67  65  52  58 56 
 





92 95 98 111  112 104 
 
Table 5: Average Revenue Per Employee (ARPE) (US$) 2009-2014 
Company 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Telecel 








690  631  702  771  342 337 
 
Table 6: EBITDA (US$) 2009-2014 
Company 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
NetOne 
 25 688 109   6 708 289   12 890 233   13 270 095   25 454 419   31 392 051  
 
Econet 
26 600 000 179 28 242 242 700 000 290 900 00 305 300 000 332 200 000 
 
Table 7: CAPEX (US$) 2009-2014 
Company 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Net*One 
 17 203 558   34 055 863   46 727 210   25 488 778   30 586 752   48 542 151  
 
Econet 
34 195 449 160 000 000 270 000 000 216 000 000 147 000 000 1 200 000 000 
 
In terms of revenue generation, Net*One was number three out of three. Information obtained 
from POTRAZ presented in tables 2.1 to 2.3 below show the financial performance of 
Net*One compared to its competitors Econet Wireless and Telecel over the said period.  
 
Table 8: Revenues (ZW$ Million) 1997-2001 





                          
387  
                          
530  
                          
1,286  




                            
28  
                          
403  
                          
629  
                          
1,472  









                          
460  
                          
1,323  
                 
3,312  
Total                              
28  
                          
790  
                      
1,619  
                          
4,081  
                 
8,625  
*Telecel and Econet started operating in 1998 and 1999 respectively 
Table 9: Revenues (ZW$ Million) 2002-2007 
Company 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Telecel 18,000 45,000 130,000 340,000 756,698 5,245,746 
NetOne 16,042 31,000 111,008 279,494 455,780 3,275,629 
Econet 23,809 48,000 192,504 647,355 1,424,035 11,462,593 
Total  57,851 124,000 433,512 1,266,849 2,636,513 19,983,968 
*2008 revenues could not be accurately consolidated because of the hyperinflationary period 
and the removal of zeros from the ZW currency multiple times. 
Table 10: Revenues (US$) 2009-2014 
Company 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Telecel 
           
69,034,912  
           
85,208,934  
           
99,109,700  
         
135,120,894  











95 274 401  
  
94 662 845  
  
105 529 419  
  
113 066 485  
 
Econet 
         
295,872,107  
         
446,345,209  
         
552,373,776  
         
654,542,156  






         
465,837,562  
         
610,096,665  
         
746,757,877 
         
884,325,895  





In terms of profits, NetOne also made significant losses from 2010-2014 as revealed by its 
Audited Financial Statements summarized below. Meanwhile NetOne’s major competitors, 
Econet Wireless Zimbabwe and Telecel Zimbabwe made huge profits over the same period 
with Econet upsetting its loss from US$1.6 million in 2009.  As shown in table 11 below, 
NetOne made a total loss of about US$48 million in the last 6 years. 
 
Table 11: Profits ($US) 2009-2014 
 
Company 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
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NetOne  7. 7m  (13.6m)  (7.7m)  (5.9m)  (4.8m)  (5.8m)  
Telecel 1.9m 19.8m 4.7m 22m 30m * 
Econet 1.6m  113.2m 140.9m 165.7m 139.9m 119.4m 
*Telecel figure for 2014 not available due to ownership and licensing challenges faced by the 
company from the middle of 2014 
 
5.4. NETONE’S FINANCIAL POSITION AND BANKABILITY 
At the time of study, NetOne had and unsustainable cash flow position evidenced by 
accumulation of domestic payables and receivables from other SOEs, the Central 
Government and private sector suppliers.  Treasury, through Government Ministries, owes 
NetOne more than US$6 million. Effectively, NetOne is subsidizing defaulting customers. A 
number of Ministers, and Parliamentarians were reported to owe NetOne large sums of 
money since 2009. At the time of research, sources at NetOne indicated that the company is 
owed close to US$60 million (shown in Table 12 below) an amount whose provision in their 
financials constitutes much of the losses the company is making.  
Table 12: Amounts owed to NetOne 
Entity Amount 
1 Direct Consumers (corporates and individuals) $30m 
2 Zelco (former agent) $15m 
3 Firstel (former agent) $8m 
4 Central Government  $5m 
Total $59m 
Source: NetOne 
NetOne also owes huge amounts of money its lenders, the regulator and other operators in 
statutory obligations and interconnection fees. It is also servicing legacy debts it took over 
when the government unbundled the Post and Telecommunications Corporation 
PTC). Table 13 below shows its debt position. 
Table 13: NetOne debts 
Entity Amount 
1 Huawei $218m 
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2 Other international lenders (legacy debt) $14 
3 Local lenders $20m 
4 Other operators $19m 




The three mobile telecommunications companies directly employ over 3000 people broken 
down in Table1below. Statistics clearly show that NetOne employs the least number of 
people. 
Table 14: Direct employment by company 
Company Number of people employed  
Econet 2 000 
Telecel    700 
NetOne     437 
Total 3 137 
Compiled by author from various sources 
 
5.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented NetOne's performance in terms of market share and financial 
performance, that is, revenues and profits in comparison to Econet Wireless and 
Telecel. It revealed that the state enterprise has performed dismally over the years. The 
researcher therefore concludes that NetOne must improve its revenue generation to improve 
its ARPU, ARPE and EBITDAs to comparable levels with the market leader Econet 
Wireless.  Could it be its cost structures? Is it weak supervision? What are the causal factors 
for this state of affairs? The following chapter seeks to answer these questions?  
This section presented NetOne’s performance in terms of market share and financial 
performance, service offerings and contribution to employment in comparison to Econet 
Wireless and Telecel Zimbabwe. It revealed that the state enterprise has performed dismally 
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over the years and is burned by debts and amounts owed to it by its clients portraying an 























CHAPTER 6: CAUSAL FACTORS FOR NETONE'S UNDERPERFORMANCE 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the causes of NetOne’s underperformance from both an internal and 
external perspective. These will be examined as underlying and proximate contributory 
factors 
6.2. UNDERLYING CAUSES 
6.2.1. Politics of patronage, misappropriation of rents, control and interference  
The root cause of NetOne’s problems is embedded in the Zimbabwean political settlements 
and the political and economic history of the country.  
It is this researcher’s view that NetOne is a product of anti-development patrimonialism since 
it was created to thwart Econet Wireless in wanton disregard of the country's laws. As seen in 
Chapters 4 and 5, when Econet came into play, it overtook NetOne. NetOne practically lacks 
the incentive to grow as a company but instead spends a lot of effort fighting wars to destroy 
other operators especially Econet Wireless as evidenced by its refusal to pay $12 million 
interconnection fees owed to Econet Wireless (www.techzim.co.zw, 27 August 2012) and 
seeking government protection when it was disconnected ((www.techzim.co.zw, 27 August 
2012).  
Just to show how ZANU PF political control is a major factor in the affairs of the company, 
in 2009, following the formation of the All Inclusive Government, NetOne together 
other telecommunications related state enterprises and parastatals was initially placed under 
the Ministry of Information Communication Technology headed by Nelson Chamisa of 
MDC-T (T. Saharo, The Zimbabwean Online Newspaper, 17 April 2009). Barely a week into 
the life of the new government there was a clash at NetOne offices between Webster Shamhu 
ZANU PF), the then Minister of Media, Information and Publicity and Nelson Chamisa, the 
then Minister of Information Technology. According to the Zimbabwe Independent 
Newspaper of 26 February 2009, Shamhu had purportedly gone to address the grievances of 
the workers at NetOne and the meeting was eventually abandoned. The president then reacted 
by putting NetOne under the newly renamed Ministry of Transport, Communication and 
Infrastructural Development. This ministry was headed by Nicholas Goche, a former senior 
ZANU PF cabinet minister. Mugabe took away NetOne from Chamisa, allegedly following 
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pressure from ZANU PF allies who perceived the company to be of strategic security 
importance, hence too risky to be in the of the MDC-T minister.  
At the lapse of the All- Inclusive Government in October 2013, NetOne was then emplaced 
under the Minister of Information Communication Technology, Postal and Courier Services 
when Webster Shamu appointed was appointed the new Minister. A month later at the re-
launch of the underperforming OneWallet, Net One's money transfer application, Shamu who 
was the guest of honour and dressed in party regalia demonstrated deep rooted patronage 
when he declared that the Managing Director was safe and would not go anywhere. This is 
despite the fact that the company was performing poorly (Herald, 9 November 2013). 
As noted in the literature review, for political reasons, there is no performance management 
and measurement of the company as is the case with all other SOEs in Zimbabwe. The 
assertion by Caiden and Kwanbo (1991) reflects reality in what happens at NetOne where the 
company's resources are prone to use for other purposes other than economic development 
and social service provision. According to the Zimbabwe Independent, the then Ministry of 
State Enterprises and Parastatals reported that ministers from the political divide were 
crippling the state enterprises and parastatals including NetOne by illegally double dipping 
from government organizations (The Independent, 5 June 2015).  
Ironically, speaking at the re-launch of NetOne's mobile money transfer service, OneWallet, 
the former Minister of ICT, Postal and Courier Services Webster Shamhu blamed 
government for prejudicing NetOne through bureaucracy when he said; 
"The NetOne giant has awoken and is ready to compete with other players in the country. We 
as government no longer want to disadvantage the company; there will be no more 
bureaucracy in government and when NetOne wants something we will make 
sure it's done without delay," (The Financial Gazette, 16 January 2014,) ...and that  
"NetOne is always lagging behind because of bureaucracy in government resulting in some 
of its ideas getting stolen before implementation'' (Business Daily, 11 November 2014).  
According to officers at the company, NetOne is regarded as ‘Network Yemusangano’ 
(ZANU PF network) and it is common knowledge that the company supports ZANU PF 
political functions like congresses and conferences. Anonymous sources at NetOne disclosed 
that company also donates cash, transport, sim cards, laptops, smartphones and other freebies 
to ZANU PF for distribution to its supporters during election campaigns. 
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The following examples seek to illustrate this assertion: 
1. Sokwanele (6 June 2004) writing about the 2004 by election in Matabeleland North 
province reported the use of NetOne vehicles to carry ZANU PF supports around the 
constituency.  
2. According to Balancing Act online publication (11 March 2011) it seemed ZANU PF 
abused the status of NetOne to send anti-sanctions campaigns messages to all NetOne 
subscribers yet it threatened to cancel Econet Wireless' licence in 2008 when MDC-T's 
campaign messages were transmitted through the network (Newsday, 6 March, 2011) 
3. On 28 January 2009, Moses Muchemwa reported that the ZANU PF run mobile network 
provider, NetOne, was sued for rejecting to receipt Zimbabwe from desperate clients 
(ZimEye, 28 January 2009). 
4. During the 2009 ZANU PF Congress, The Zimbabwe Mail reported that there was a 
Mnangagwa ( now Vice President) faction command centre at the Kopje Plaza, Fourth 
Floor occupied by a company called Firstel Cellular, NetOne intermediary seized by 
ZANU PF from exiled businessman Mutumwa Mawere (Zimbabwe Daily, 11 December 
2009). 
5. The Zimbabwe Independent of 24 reported that cash strapped SOEs including NetOne 
was forced to donate up to $120 000 each for the first Lady Grace Mugabe's birthday. 
6. NetOne management confirmed donating to ZANU PF functions and erecting stands for 
ZANU PF congresses and conferences (Anonymous) 
7. In 2005, a ZANU PF Minister responsible for supervising the company ordered NetOne 
to allocate to him thousands of free lines for his political campaign in his rural 
constituency yet there was poor network coverage in the area (Anonymous). 
8. In 2015, the Minister responsible for the supervision of NetOne directed that a base 
station be installed in his remote and underserviced area despite it being unprofitable for 
the company (Anonymous). 
It is the author’s contention that politicisation plays a major role in the underperformance of 
NetOne. This section affirms Hypothesis 1 that given the political settlements and rent 
management system in Zimbabwe NetOne will continue to underperform if there is no 
change of ideology and approach to managing SOEs in Zimbabwe. Furthermore it has 
perennially affected corporate governance as discussed in the following section. 
6.2.2. NetOne’s Governance 
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As seen in Chapter 4, the ZANU PF led government inherited and nurtured the colonial 
regime’s system of institutionalised politicised economic rents extraction. With the ruling 
ZANU PF party highly cash-strapped following the failure of its companies from which it 
used to extract rents, it has turned to state enterprises such as NetOne as sources of resources 
to run its operations. This is orchestrated through the appointment of politicised boards loyal 
to the ruling party. 
Querying NetOne's underperformance, Eldred Masunugure (2014) argues that patronage is at 
the centre of how ZANU PF operates and it is clear from how presidential appointments are 
made from ministerial appointments down to other levels where appointments are secondarily 
on merit and primarily on patronage.  He blames poor corporate governance as the chief 
reason why NetOne trails Econet and sometimes Telecel in terms of market share and 
profitability when it was the first to get an operating licence. He concludes that just like most 
of the SOEs NetOne must be making profit but rent –seeking behaviour by boards and 
management have seen it failing. As also noted by Dawson and Kelsall (2011), upon attaining 
independence the administration of SOEs in Zimbabwe increasingly changed in character 
from production and marketing mechanisms into sites of political patronage as ZANU PF 
appointed boards were based less on technical competence than on clientelism and NetOne is 
no exception. Below is a sample of some of the NetOne board members linked to ZANU PF. 
to perform as expected. Table 15 below shows some of the board members linked to ZANU 
PF. 
Table 1: Selected NetOne Board Members with ZANU PF links 2000-2015 
NAME PERIOD GENDER BACKGROUND POSITION 
Reward Kangai  2000 M Net*One Managing 
Director and known ZANU 
PF stalwart 
Board Chair 
Irene Zindi  F Former and current ZANU 
PF MP 
 




Muvengwa Mukarati 2001-2005 M Losing ZANU PF 
parliamentary candidate for 
2005 
Board Member 
Mainos Mudukuti 2001-2005 M Son of ZANU PF stalwart Board Member 
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and National Hero George 
Mudukuti 




Mazwi Fani Dandato 2005-2012 M Firstel Director a company 
which had strong ZANU 
PF ties 
Board Member 
Kenzias Chabota 2005-2012 M Businessman and ZANU 
PF stalwart 
Board Member 
Angeline Dambaza 2005-2012 F Alleged relative of the 
President 
Board Member 
Gabriel Mugabe 2005-2007 M Alleged relative of the 
President 
Board Member 
Sydney Nyanungo  2014 - 2015 M CIO and ZANU PF 
stalwart 
Vice Board Chair 
Ministry Officials 2012-2014  Civil servants under direct 
supervision of the Minister 
and expected to tow the 
ZANU PF line 
Board Chairs and 
Board Members 
Source: Various 
It is important to note that some managers had shares in Firstel leading to corporate incest. 
Furthermore, the basis for Ministers appointing these boards is not justified since NetOne is a 
private limited company which should operate under the Companies Act yet it is treated like 
a parastatal. 
These politicised boards lack autonomy and cannot make critical decisions regarding to 
procurement and employment without clearance from the responsible Minister and other 
government stakeholders. The practice of corporate governance at NetOne as is the case with 
all other SOEs is atypical of what Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, (2013) call `isomorphic 
mimicry’ where there is compliance in terms of form and not functionality.  
The study established that while NetOne had standard corporate governance structures and 
practices are in place its performance remains poor. The corporate governance practices have 
not had a positive impact on the performance of the company. Strategy and business growth 
implementation are also singled out as particularly bad. Intermittent periods that the company 
went through without substantive boards negatively affected corporate governance practices 
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in particular. Poor corporate governance has negatively affected the company's performance 
and continuously works against its efforts to attract foreign partners. An in-depth analysis of 
these key corporate governance instruments reveals that the missing link to improve their 
effectiveness is the dual role that government plays as both referee and player in the business 
world. 
 The government is often found wanting when it fails to distinguish its policy making role 
and shareholder position. Because of the failure to address this conflict of interest even with 
sound governance systems in place, NetOne will still fail to perform satisfactorily. An 
analysis of NetOne's strategic and operational documents reveals various strategic 
performance aspects that are well below the average as well as sector benchmarks. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, NetOne is seen to be performing badly because it is approaching the 
government with begging bowls instead of dividend cheques while its private sector 
counterparts are paying dividends to their shareholders. Strategic decisions by the board of 
directors are part of good corporate governance practices that determine the performance of 
the firm (Davis 2002). Short and long term viability of the firm as well as profitability is part 
of such good practices.  
The documentary analysis revealed serious poor liquidity and profitability challenges for 
NetOne. These findings are corroborated by the research findings as discussed above. Despite 
all the good provisions cited above, NetOne like other SOEs continues to perform dismally. 
In my analysis of the key governance instruments, I noted that the missing link to the above 
important observations was the dual role that government plays as both referee and player in 
the business world. The government is often found wanting when it fails to distinguish its 
policy making role and shareholder position in SOEs despite the provisions of the NCCG and 
the legal statutes. If this conflict of interest is not addressed even sound governance systems, 
NetOne will continue to perform unsatisfactorily. Overall, on the financial performance 
analysed above, the research findings conclude that some of NetOne's challenges are a 
strategic corporate governance matter that the respective corporate governance structures in 
place failed to contain. This confirms the research Hypothesis 2 stated in Chapter Two that 
the poor performance by NetOne may be associated with poor corporate governance 
practices, providing an answer to research the question questions. 
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6.2.3. Lack of adequate investment capital 
This section looks at the above factors which are tied to the political system and seeks to 
prove postulations in Hypothesis 4. It also seeks to answer research questions 1, 2 and 3. 
The telecommunications industry requires innovation and is capital intensive in nature and as 
such, there is need for massive capital injection by operators. The institutional endowment of 
Zimbabwe is a critical determinant factor for NetOne’s performance. Because investors are 
wary of the government’s potential to behave opportunistically by altering the rules of the 
game to take advantage of those who have made fixed investments they require credible 
assurances and insulation against expropriation of property and bureaucratic hold ups that 
negatively affect profitability. The environment under which NetOne operates is not 
conducive for innovation. 
6.2.3.1 Undercapitalisation 
Due to western economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe (1999 to present) and the hype of 
indigenisation, NetOne did not receive any lines of credit from its traditional foreign lenders 
for more than 10 years. Notwithstanding these constraints, NetOne used local loans which 
were short-term and with high interest rates, and internally generated revenues to roll out the 
existing network infrastructure, meaning NetOne can do better with adequate and timely 
funding.  
According to sources at NetOne long periods of undercapitalisation resulted in NetOne 
lagging behind competition in infrastructure development, upgrade and augmentation thereby 
affecting it in terms of quality of services, innovation and product scope. This has been really 
critical in an environment where the first mover is always the winner. NetOne got the first 
loan-funding in 1997-1999. The next funding was in 2011, from China EXIM Bank. The 
initial loans were for 7 years. According to NetOne’s Managing Director, Finance Manager 
and Internal Auditor, in 2002, they could not pay external loans and ING Bank of Tokyo put 
a lot of pressure. NetOne paid Z$263million, then equivalent to US$11 million to 
Government for onward remittance to the creditors. The debt was not paid and Treasury did 
not return the money.  
There are also claims from NetOne management that it never received direct funding from 
government since its formation although it enjoys an exemption to pay licence fees pegged at 
US$137.5m. This lack of funding was corroborated by Patrick Chinamasa, the Minister of 
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Finance when he moved a motion for Parliament to ratify Government's loan application 
from China to support NetOne when he said: 
"We [Government] have not given any meaningful capital to NetOne 
right from its inception and for that reason, Comrade Kangai who has been at the helm of 
this institution needs to be credited for growing this company from nothing and it is for this 
reason that he needs to be commended. One of the reasons why it lagged behind although it 
was first in the business is precisely that it was under capitalised'' (Parliament of Zimbabwe 
Report, Thursday, 18 September, 2014) 
This is contrary to assertions by the Minister of ICT, Postal and Courier Services who said; 
"As government we have now invested more money into the company and we must see results. 
We cannot have the same performance." (Techzim, May 2015). This statement was made in 
reference to the loan that NetOne accessed from EximBank of China in 2014.  
When NetOne started it had the widest coverage across the country owing to the 
deployment of basic infrastructure through government guaranteed loans and easy access to 
lines of credit. The major obstacle hampering the development and extension of the network 
systems and service expansion by NetOne is lack of funds and low infrastructure sharing. 
NetOne's footprint has over the years been affected by low infrastructural development, 
upgrading and augmentation. According to engineers at NetOne, most of the infrastructure 
which is supposed to be replaced after 5 to 7 years has not been replaced in the past 15 years 
and is almost obsolete hence needs continuous replacement and upgrading to catch up with 
ever-changing technological developments to carry different services.  
The Sunday Mail newspaper of 4 May 2014 ran an article entitled `Mobile giants locked in 
mortal combat: Telecel, Econet battle for supremacy. NetOne now insignificant' confirming 
the position that investment is key to gaining market share in the mobile telecommunications 
industry. The article also buttresses that the market share is getting to be a `zero-sum' game 
and that economies of scale are key business drivers.  
6.2.3.2 Expensive capital 
Another contributor to the underperformance of the company is the expensive money it 
borrows to finance its operations. For a variety reasons but mainly political, NetOne is unable 
to borrow from its traditional sources and has to find other sources where it gets interests 
rates as high as 30% per annum (Techzim, 6 August 2012).  
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6.2.3.3 Economic challenges 
During the years of hyperinflation (2002-2008), NetOne just like all other SOEs was 
embedded in a vicious circle of distortions. It faced several viability problems as it operated 
at controlled non-economic tariffs. The most challenging problem can be singled out as the 
acute shortage of foreign currency on the official market and failed to import spare parts to 
upgrade and service its aging infrastructure.  
6.2.3.4. Bad debtors 
As illustrated in Chapter 5 NetOne has accumulated of domestic payables and receivables 
from other SOEs, the Central Government and private sector suppliers owing to unfavourable 
economic and market conditions. Various Government entities NetOne more than US$6 
million. Effectively, NetOne is subsidizing defaulting customers. A number of Ministers and 
Parliamentarians are reported owe NetOne large sums of money since 2009. At the time of 
research, sources at NetOne indicated that the company is owed close to US$60 million an 
amount whose provision in their financials constitutes much of the losses the company is 
making. These owed resources if they had been paid to the company and with proper 
deployment could have gone a long way in improving the company’s balance sheet and 
competitiveness. 
6.2.3.5. Debt Overhang 
As shown in Chapter 5, NetOne is also servicing legacy debts it took over when the 
government unbundled the Post and Telecommunications Corporation PTC).  It also owes 
huge amounts of money to its lenders, the regulator and other operators in statutory 
obligations and interconnection fees.  
6.3. PROXIMATE CAUSES 
This section provides the linkages between political settlements and corporate governance 
and their effects on company performance attempting to prove or disprove Hypothesis 2.  
Some of the effects of bad corporate governance are NetOne's poor organisational culture, 
bad leadership, weak internal management practices and their toll on the company's 
performance.  
6.3.1. Poor organisational culture 
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Due to politicisation and poor oversight, the leadership and top management of the company 
is characterised by corruption, self-aggrandizement and suppression of low level employees. 
According to sources in the company, top executives from the Managing Director down to 
manager level have unquestionable authority and the privileges amid allegations of rampant 
siphoning of company resources for private gain. 
When faced with difficult situations, executives avoid getting involved, because if something 
goes wrong, they fear that they might get fired, but nobody gets fired for doing nothing. At 
NetOne's top level, executives have stayed in their posts with the Managing Director having 
been at the helm for almost 20 years and other senior management members having been in 
their positions for more than 15 years leading to innovative inertia.  
6.3.2. Low employee engagement 
Just like other SOEs NetOne is a hierarchical company run bureaucratically. Whilst NetOne 
workers are also reported paid well and on time, they are demotivated since they feel they are 
not given room to be innovative to grow and realise their potential.  
Because of the company culture employees are generally demotivated. They do not feel 
valued. The company vision is not known by the employees. People are promoted based on 
seniority or influence, with very little attention paid to actual performance. Said one of the 
employees whose identity will remain anonymous: 
‘I am NetOne for the money. Whether I perform or not no-one bothers. Our management is 
untouchable, corrupt and insensitive to our professional needs. They view themselves as 
emperors and owners of the company. Communication is a big problem and there is a lot of 
spying behind the scenes. People get fired for the slightest of mistakes if they are considered 
undesirable elements. Our management does not walk the talk. The performance 
management system called the Balanced Scorecard is only there on paper not in practice’. 
(Anonymous Interviewee, June 2015).  
6.3.3. Weak Internal Controls, Unethical Behaviour and Corruption 
NetOne was not spared the so called `Salarygate Scandal' that hit Zimbabwean SOEs in 2014. 
At the time of study, NetOne was alleged the highest paying state enterprise. It was made 
public by The Herald Newspaper, The Daily News and The News Day on the 28th of January 
2014, that NetOne's Managing Director earns a whopping US$43 000 per month, over and 
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above other undisclosed sums of money which include housing, education and vehicle 
allowances.  Furthermore NetOne has lost and continues to lose a lot of real and potential 
revenues due to theft, procurement malpractices, fraud and outright corruption for which no 
recourse effective was taken as demonstrated in Table16 below. 















NetOne and State 
Procurement Board 
2001 None. Case only 
revealed 13 years 
later in 2014 
NetOne loses $5m 
in unsecured debt 








Marketing and Sales 
Director, Staff in 
Marketing and Sales 
Department 
2013 Several employees 
fired but nothing 











Senior Management 2012 None 
NetOne gives 
management loans 
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Dodzo still on the 
run. Nothing was 
recovered. 
NetOne bought 3 
Toyota Prado 
SUVs at $412 000. 








Senior Management 2010 Nothing was done 
A South African 
company which 
undertook a job 
evaluation exercise 
was paid more than 
200 000.00 instead 













6.4. Poor consumer service and uncompetitive approaches to business  
In mobile telecommunications, service quality is generally regarded as being a key 
factor in the creation of worth and in influencing customer satisfaction. To provide improved 
quality service, telecommunication companies need to investigate the degree of consumers' 
sensitivities and expectations towards service quality. Armed with such information these 
companies are then able to strategically focus service quality objectives and procedures to fit 
their specific markets. Service quality can be described as a rationale 
of differences between expectation and competence along the important quality dimensions. 
Gronroos (1988) as well as Parasuraman, Zeithaml identified ten requirements useful for 
consumers' evaluation of the quality of services: reliability, responsiveness, tangibles, 
communication credibility, security, competence, courtesy, understanding the consumers and 
service accessibility.  
6.4.1. Poor Consumer Service 
In a Consumer Satisfaction Research commissioned by POTRAZ in 2014, it was noted that 
while NetOne offers the cheapest services in terms of voice and data charges, it was still rated 
the least terms of consumer satisfaction among the three players.  
Reasons given by the consumers were network reception ratings were mainly to do with 
availability and reliability while the reasons for coverage ratings focused on wide availability 
and countrywide coverage. In both rural and urban areas poor coverage was also reported. 
Consumers were also not happy with the recharge procedure (which only applies to non-
contract clients) which was reported to take too long to complete while the numbers were 
said to be unclear and too small. It was also reported that terms and conditions to 
access and register sim cards were too long and complicated, NetOne experiences frequent 
call drops. Without improved consumer satisfaction NetOne there continues to have a low 
market share and consequently low revenues. 
6.4.2. Uncompetitive approaches to business 
The telecommunications global market continues to challenge operators to provide new and 
better performing products while at the same time balancing these developments with 
meeting the ever-changing customer requirements.  This tenet seems to elude NetOne as 
evidenced by the deployment of the money transfer application OneWallet. NetOne started 
with the mobile money product in 2010 only to fail to demonstrate its functionality on the 
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night of the launch. This eventually led to its uptake and popularity fading and the 
competition from Econet Wireless and Telecel mobile money platforms outperforming 
OneWallet.  
According to the Comptroller and Auditor-General's report of 2012, Net One generated a 
paltry US$1194.00 revenue from OneWallet for the year ending 31 December 2012 after 
investing almost US$225 867.00 in the product AG Report, 2012, p.44).  This translates to a 
mere 0.005% return on investment. One Wallet was then re-launched in November 2013 
accounts for a meagre 0.1% of total money transfer deposits (POTRAZ, 2015). There are a 
number of reasons for OneWallet's dismal failure.  
(i) The problem that NetOne faces is product testing as well as poor planning and 
celebrating victory instead of recognising that success demands greater effort, 
commitment and sacrifice from management.  
(ii) OneWallet was hastily launched leading to substandard quality control measures. 
There was a laxity to be patient and recognise that product development takes 
time.  
(iii) Furthermore there is a small catchment for the product due to a low number of 
agents and dealers. NetOne has only 1 612 compared to 17 181 and 4 586 for 
Econet Wireless and Telecel respectively (POTRAZ, April 2015).  
To worsen the situation, NetOne despite enjoying wide coverage in remote areas fails to 
distribute adequate airtime. Airtime is mainly through NetOne flagship shops, ZIMPOST, 
Tel-One OK, Born Marche and Innscor retail outlets.  However, only ZIMPOST, which 
unfortunately is also closing some of its shops, is the only one with nationwide presence to 
enable NetOne to provide services countrywide. The effect of this is loss of both revenue and 
market share since consumers tend to switch to other service providers whose airtime they 
can access. This research established that NetOne owes most of its dealers their commissions 
which are supposed to be paid on the 9th of each month. Some dealers go for up to six 
months without being paid and eventually fold their business relationships with NetOne.  
NetOne is also a laggard in adapting to the ever-changing environment in which it operates. 
When cell-phones started in in Zimbabwe they were largely for the elite and well to do, hence 
they were s dubbed `Nhare Mbozha or Elite Phone'. NetOne remained in this mode for almost 
15 years until 2011 when it introduced prepaid lines. 
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Just before the end of the hyperinflation period in early 2009, NetOne's competitors moved 
all their clients to the pre-paid platform. This business decision taken by the private operators 
had two effects. Firstly, it made the ownership and use of mobile cellular phones a mass 
market thus registering massive growth in the number of telephones per population of 100. 
Econet Wireless and Telecel got cash before it was eroded by inflation, converted the local 
currency into foreign currency and thus shut out the inflation risk.  
On the other hand most of NetOne's clients who were mainly government Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies and their employees remained on the post-paid platform and 
literally enjoyed NetOne services for free. During this period NetOne lost greatly in market 
share let alone revenue. Econet Wireless and Telecel introduced internet services in 2009 and 
2010 respectively while NetOne only followed suit four years later in but only for its prepaid 
subscribers. . While Econet Wireless and Telecel introduced Whatsapp and Facebook bundles 
in October 2013 respectively, NetOne only did the same in March 2015. This led to it losing 
significant market share as consumers migrated to the other two operators to enjoy these 
value added services. It is in this area of providing value added services where NetOne really 
falls short as illustrated in Table 17 below. 
Table 17: Comparative range of value added services offered by mobile 
telecommunications companies 
NAME OF SERVICE AND 
PRODUCTS AND PROMOTIONS 
ECONET NETONE TELECEL 
Internet data       





      
Individual money 
transfers across networks 
      
Salary payments       
Dstv payments        
Retail payments       
Electricity payments       
Local Authorities utility 
payments 
      
Tel-One bill payments       
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Farmer support       
Prepaid        
General Post-paid       
Premier Post-paid       
Handsets       
Solar chargers       
Internet devices       
Airtime promotions       
Handset promotions       
Vehicle tracking       
WhatsApp and Facebook bundles       
Medical services       
Life insurance       
Total number of services offered out 
of 21 
    20     14      15 
Compiled by author from various sources 
6.5. Chapter Summary 
Political rents, self-aggrandisement by top management and abuse of company assets as well 
as poor consumer service and business approaches have been cited as some of 
the major contributing factors to the mediocre performance of NetOne. Furthermore, the 
undemocratic genesis of NetOne has perpetually afflicted its performance owing to lack of 
public sympathy hence low uptake of its services since it was and continues to be seen as an 
agent of the oppression and suppression of freedom of expression and communication.  
The chapter concludes that there has never been any serious effort to reform NetOne through 
good corporate governance hence the company is failing to operate viably in order to fulfil its 
mandate. Related to the case of poor business approaches discussed below, NetOne has 
worsened its plight by treating other private operators as enemies of the state and therefore its 
enemies with whom it is anathema to do business with, hence its failure to pay 





CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS, WAYS FORWARD AND CONCLUSION 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides recommendations for possible consideration in the reform of NetOne 
and they are definitely not meant to be panacea to a myriad of challenges facing the 
company. In fact, the chapter adds to the growing corpus of literature on the reform of SOEs 
to enhance their viability. Since there is hardly a single consideration or simplistic framework 
of issues that determines how public enterprises can be more effective in achieving strategic 
national goals' (Mokoena, 2012), the views here express some alternative approaches. It is 
therefore imperative and urgent for the Government of Zimbabwe to implement the long 
overdue reforms for NetOne.  
It concludes that NetOne's problems are complex, and resolving them should not be reduced 
to mechanistic implementation of pre-defined plans and copying and pasting best practices 
since what works in one situation or country does not necessarily work in another.  
7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAYS FORWARD 
7.2.1. Finding a strategic private partner for NetOne 
The government of Zimbabwe must find a strategic partner for NetOne. Getting a strategic 
private partner provides opportunities for commercial and profit orientation as well as 
impetus for further growth unlike the current mandate for NetOne which is divided between 
economic performance and social equity. Through higher efficiency gains and profits 
deployment, government can obtain additional revenue to finance other socioeconomic 
development initiatives. Although the contexts are different, empirical studies were done in 
the UK in 1991 which led to the conclusion that a change towards greater autonomy of an 
SOE is associated with improvements in efficiency (The Zimbabwe Independent, 20 January 
2014). This can be in the form of a Chinese telecommunications company like China Mobile 
or Huawei which has long worked with NetOne in infrastructure development, deployment 
and augmentation. This partnership and may bring in the following envisaged benefits;  
 Use of its established market presence in Africa and the world to bring in the requisite 
economies of scale especially in infrastructure investment and procurement 
challenges bedevilling NetOne.  
 Attraction of access to affordable capital owing to the reputation of the company. 
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 Efficiency can be promoted through a commercially driven and innovation oriented 
structure which is free from general government bureaucratic rigidities and insulating 
the company from direct political control and interference through changed 
shareholding arrangements.  
.  
7.2.2. Reforms for Improving NetOne’s Corporate Governance 
Poor corporate governance coupled with political interference by the executive is responsible 
for the many ills of NetOne. While there is a nexus between political interference and poor 
corporate governance, it is the latter that is explicit and therefore could be systematically 
rectified. The Government of Zimbabwe's launch of the Corporate Governance Framework in 
2010 and later the National Code on Corporate Governance in 2015 serve as testimony of the 
gravity of the problem. The following are some additional ways that could improve corporate 
governance at NetOne. 
7.2.2.1.Streamlining of Responsibilities and Reporting Structures 
There should be streamlining of responsibilities of NetOne’s boards. It could be ideal for the 
Managing Director to be accountable to the respective Boards and not the Ministry and 
Parliament. There should therefore be transparency in Board appointments and remuneration 
practices. The treatment of NetOne as an extension of ministerial powers and hence personal 
fiefdom should be curtailed. The responsible Minister and civil servants in the Ministry 
should focus on policy and not the business of the NetOne which Boards should be 
empowered to handle and report to Parliament. 
7.2.2.2.Membership and Composition of NetOne Boards 
 Membership in successive NetOne boards can be identified as clearly a causal factor 
hampering effectiveness of Boards while increasing political patronage, especially ministerial 
interference. In addition to transparency in selection to Boards and remuneration procedures, 
there should be a limit to the number of SOEs Boards that a member could serve in 
concurrently. While it is unavoidable to have SOEs Boards being retirement homes for 
legislators, ministers, diplomats and more significantly the military, the composition of 
Boards could strengthen their performance if they also include academics, etc. In other 
countries, the use of independent directors strengthens the capacity of Boards to deliver on 
their mandates. It might also be useful to define clearly the Board evaluation and benchmark 
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systems and procedures. The public should know the targets of the particular boards and 
whether or not they meet the set targets. 
7.2.2..3. Curtailing Political Interference in the form of Ministerial Directives 
The current system for a company which is governed by the Companies Act surprisingly 
gives excessive control to the line ministry, especially the relevant Minister. The 
discretionary powers of the relevant Minister have allowed for micro-managing of NetOne 
and consequently political patronage that compromises corporate governance. The 
responsible Ministry should continue to play the overseeing policy roles but not interference 
in the management and operations of the company. There is need to develop and clearly spell 
out the distinct mandates in the legislative and policy frameworks. 
7.2.2.4.Training of Boards of NetOne and Managing  Board Performance 
The appropriate training of the current and future Board members of NetOne in corporate 
governance, anti-corruption practices, performance management and results-based 
management will yield the much-needed results in the running and governance of the 
company.  
7.2.3. Reforms for ethical behaviour  
Although a more detailed discussion on ethics has already been given in section 1, it is still 
imperative to highlight briefly how these could enhance SOEs viability. The following are 
recommended reforms of improving governance and professional ethics as means of the 
potential of NetOne. 
7.2.3.1. Raising the Cost of Corruption  
Countries that have stamped out excessive corrupt practices in the public sector like China or 
Singapore have raised the premium on corruption (Transparency International, 2015). In 
Zimbabwe, as long as corruption continues to be treated like any ordinary crime the 
temptations shall remain high for corrupt practices, especially in SOEs. Because these are 
crimes that ordinary citizens perceive as sanctioned by the politically powerful, not much 
effort is put by citizens to help stem out the rot. If it takes special courts with prohibitive 
sentences and special police units to deal with corruption, let it be. Of course, one reason 
could be that both the police force and members of the judiciary are ill-trained and 
inadequately prepared for the complexities of the crime of corruption.  
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Corruption at NetOne is corruption of a certain kind masked under bureaucratic niceties and 
political protection usually run by syndicates in various state agencies. In certain 
circumstances, the corruption is done in connivance from some in the private sector and even 
some ordinary citizens. The penalty for corruption should be severe and no one should be 
exempt.  
Since external controls like parliamentary regulation are not adequate on their own to curtail 
unethical practices such as corruption and fraudulent activities at NetOne, it is crucial to 
emphasize employee training on identifying unethical behaviour and how to act on it. 
Increased focus should go to the facilitation of whistle blowing and the full legal protection 
of whistle-blowers. Unfortunately, employees are not adequately empowered to act for the 
good of the organization. In spite of this, the employees usually know much of the 
wrongdoing that takes place in their work. 
7.2.3.2.Public Disclosure of NetOne Activities and Deals 
There should be transparency in NetOne’s activities that include recruitment procedures and 
practices as well as transparency in deals and contracts. Citizens' awareness of NetOne’s 
unethical practices and ways of minimizing it is possible when there is public disclosure of 
activities of the company. The same principle of ‘publish what you pay' for private 
companies should apply to NetOne for public accountability in terms of what was received 
and how it was spent. Since most unethical practices are associated with the tender system 
and the award of contracts, it is important to make these as transparent as possible.  
 
7.3. CONCLUSION 
The Zimbabwe political settlements system of anti-development patrimonialism are clearly 
manifest at NetOne as the have affected corporate governance, ethical conduct and 
ultimately, the company’s underperformance. Whilst a number of statutes that govern 
corporate governance and ethical behaviour are in place the practice has largely remained 
isomorphic.  
Whether the Government of Zimbabwe remains committed to this position remains to be seen 
considering the flagrant policy violations, inconsistencies and even non-implementation. The 
immediate need for investment and capital injection at NetOne to improve its performance 
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needs to be preceded by a robust and comprehensive drive for creating a climate conducive 
for investment, eliminating policy inconsistencies and anti-corruption agenda underpinned by 
transparency and public accountability. Needless to say, it needs political will. It is not 
necessarily about ownership but the governance and ethical practices at NetOne that could 
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